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Abstract 
In this paper we have examined the relationship between economic inequality and demand for 
redistribution for 23 OECD countries and 17 European countries respectively. We depart from two 
different theories with contradictory predictions of the relationship between demand for redistribution 
and economic inequality: the median voter theorem predicting a positive correlation (Meltzer and 
Richard 1986), and the social distance model (MacRae 2006) predicting a negative correlation. We 
test the theories using two different measures of demand for redistribution: aggregate vote share of 
right wing parties and individual attitudes towards increased government redistribution. We also 
briefly examine the Prospect of Upwards Mobility hypothesis, which claims that it is not economic 
inequality as such but social mobility that determines demand for redistribution. We used election data 
from between 1975 and 2009, and survey data from 2002-2010. This enabled us to exploit the cross-
sectional and time variation in economic inequality, to study the effect on demand for redistribution. 
The main contribution of this paper lies in the usage of new data, inequality data from 2005 and 2010, 
together with more robust econometric estimation techniques, e.g. fixed effects models. The results of 
the econometric estimation for both measures of demand for redistribution do not support any of the 
theories strongly, and are principally in line with most of the literature that does not find a statistically 
significant association between economic inequality and demand for redistribution. However, we do 
identify several important methodological caveats, e.g. limited variation in explanatory variables and 
reverse causality, and therefore stress that the empirical findings should be taken with a grain of salt. 
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1. Introduction, scientific problem and purpose of study 
1.1 Introduction 
Redistribution is one of the most salient features of the states in advanced industrial societies. Approximately 
45 percent of GDP is collected and spent by governments in the OECD countries, and about half of this funds 
transfers, collectively financed services such as health care and public goods that we know as the welfare 
state.1 This alone is an argument for the importance of studying the mechanism behind redistribution. But 
government redistribution is also perhaps the most central dividing line between the political right and the 
political left. 
Closely linked to the phenomenon of redistribution is economic inequality. According to a series of reports 
published by the OECD, pre-tax economic inequality, i.e. measured before government redistribution and 
taxes, is on a rise, and has been, in all OECD member countries except France, Hungary, Belgium, Turkey 
and Greece since the beginning of the 1980s.2 This trend does not seem to halt. In 2013 the OECD issued a 
new report, stating that the great recession of 2008 increased market inequality, on average, among the OECD 
members by 1.4 percentage points between 2007 and 2010.3 For the 17 countries which data are available over 
a longer time period market income inequality increased more over the last three years than what was 
observed in the previous 12 years”.4 
In a series of classical papers in political economy by Romer, Roberts, and Meltzer and Richard, a formal 
model was chiseled out aiming to explain what the authors called the size of government i.e. redistribution. In 
a democracy with two vote-maximizing parties competing for the votes of the electorate, as the gap between 
the earnings of the median voter and the mean income rises, government redistribution will also increase. The 
logic behind this argument is that if the income distribution is skewed to the right, the income of the median 
voter will be lower than the mean income, hence the median voter would benefit from increased 
redistribution. This distance between the median voter income and the mean income can be thought of as a 
rough measure of economic inequality. Consequently, if the median voter is rational and acting in his or hers 
self-interest, the preferred level of redistribution of the median voter should increase when economic 
inequality increases. Thus, the model predicts that when economic inequality increases so will also 
government redistribution. This has been argued may have consequences for the economic performance of 
these countries as distortionary taxation is predicted to increase in countries with high inequality, which in 
turn is believed to produce lower growth.5 But empirical support for the median voter-theorem has been mixed 
(see section 3.1.1) .This has lead researchers to develop alternative theories such as the social distance model, 
                                                     
1 Moene & Wallerstein (2003) p. 485 
2 OECD (2009), OECD (2011) 
3 OECD (2013) p. 2 
4 OECD(2013)  p. 2 
5 Alesina & Rodrik (1994) 
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which we also test empirically in this study, which claims that redistribution will decrease with increasing 
inequality. This logic behind the social distance model is that individuals generally are more likely to support 
redistribution if the welfare recipient is similar to themselves. When economic inequality increases, the social 
distance between the median voter and the welfare recipient increases and the similarities thus decrease, and 
so does the median voters willingness to support redistribution. We also briefly consider a third literature, the 
POUM hypothesis, which focuses on the effect of social mobility on demand for redistribution. 
1.2 Scientific problem and purpose of study 
In this study we aim to examine the relationship between economic inequality and the demand for 
redistribution for 23 affluent OECD countries and 17 European countries, respectively.6 A number of studies 
have tried to empirically examine the median voter theorem focusing on government redistribution, but far 
fewer studies have examined the earlier step in the causal chain, i.e. how inequality affects the demand for 
redistribution (Finseraas 2008, Lübker 2007, Bowles & Gintis 2000, Kenworthy & McCall 2007, MacRae 
2006). None of these studies is fully satisfactory from a methodological perspective and our contribution to 
the literature lies primarily in the usage of more robust econometric techniques by including a longer time-
frame, and by using new data on both economic inequality and demand for redistribution.  
We construct hypotheses from the social distance model and the median voter theorem about the relationship 
between inequality and demand for redistribution, which we use to test the theories empirically. We aim to 
examine the relationship by using two different measurements of demand for redistribution and make us of the 
cross-sectional and time variation in inequality. We measure demand for redistribution with two measures: a 
survey question and right wing party vote share the notion being that right parties are less associated with 
generous redistribution and social policies, and the support for right wing parties should thus be affected by 
changes in demand for redistribution. For both models, as we have variation over time, we can make use of 
country fixed effects, which should enable a more reliable estimate of the effect of economic inequality on 
demand for redistribution. 
2. Determinants of inequality 
2.1 A short trajectory of economic inequality 
Before we examine the previous research on demand for redistribution and inequality, it is necessary to briefly 
summarize the trajectory of economic inequality and the literature on the factors driving on these changes in 
economic inequality.  
Roine et al (2009) examine the development of the top percentile income shares and find that “[a]fter roughly 
the1980 top income shares have increased substantially in Anglo-Saxon [US, New Zealand, UK, Ireland, 
                                                     
6 For a list of countries included in this study, see table A.1 in the appendix. The reason for us choosing these countries is 
that they are all since long consolidated, western-style, liberal democracies with welfare states. For reasons of 
comparability, we excluded e.g. post-soviet states. 
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Australia]  countries but not in Continental European Countries [Germany, the Netherlands]”.7 However, it is 
also clear from the data that top income shares increased in Finland, Sweden, Japan, and, in a lesser extent, 
also Spain. 
In an OECD report from 2008, including data until the mid-00s, focusing on the development of income 
inequality in the OECD countries, the authors claim that only four countries in the OECD have not 
experienced increasing inequality. Further, in an OECD report from 2011, the authors state that, in the OECD 
countries, in most cases the earnings of the richest 10 percent have increased rapidly compared with the 10 
percent of the poorest. According to the report the post-tax Gini coefficient rose with approximately 10 
percent from the mid-1980s to the late 2000s.8 
It is difficult to state how large the observed increase in inequality is, since different measures of inequality 
differ in their sensitivity to changes in different parts of the income distribution.9 Especially with Gini 
measures of economic inequality, it is important to note whether it is the Gini coefficient of gross income, 
disposable income or household income etc., since the different measures will provide different changes in 
inequality. Different measures might thus give different answers to the question if inequality has increased in 
the OECD countries. 10 
There seems to be no unified trajectory of inequality for the OECD countries. Whilst all countries included in 
our study, for which we have several observations on, except France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece, 
have experienced increasing pre-tax inequality as measured by the Gini coefficients provided by the OECD, 
some OECD countries may even have experienced decreasing inequality (Hungary and Turkey) since the 
1980s. The variation over time and across countries in the development of inequality may enable the 
disentanglement of the effect of inequality on demand for redistribution, using panel data and pooled cross-
section data.11 
The lack of an overarching common story of the developments of inequality is reflected in the literature on the 
determinants of inequality. The relationship between rising income inequality, developments in domestic 
politics and economic globalisation is subject of widely varying interpretations among scholars, policy makers 
and political activists. A range of different factors are believed to play a role in rising inequality in the 
developed world in the last decades.12 In this section we will briefly survey the most commonly though 
determinants of inequality and the different interpretations of their effects.  
                                                     
7 Roine et al (2009) p. 980 
8 OECD(2011) p.22 
9 OECD (2008) p. 28 
10 OECD (2011) p. 26 
11 OECD (2011) p.22 
12 Mahler (2004) p. 1027 
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2. 2 International and external determinants of inequality 
2.2.1 Globalization 
With the increased integration of international commodity, capital and labour markets during the 20th century, 
it is reasonable to assume that international factors in addition to domestic factors play an ever growing part in 
the explanation of country specific income inequality.13 However, opinions on how increased ‘globalization’ 
affects income inequality differ widely among scholars. The four different aspects of globalization discussed 
in this section are international trade, immigration, foreign direct investment and global financial flows. 
Critics of global integration commonly point out the growth in international trade as one of the determinants 
behind rising inequality.14 From the mid-1960s to 1990 the share of output exported grew from 12 to 20 
percent in high-income countries.15 This view is supported by extensions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, 
notably the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and by the factor prize equalization theorem. According to the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, countries will export products produced with the country’s relatively abundant 
factors and import products produced with production factors that are relatively scarce in the country (Ohlin, 
1935). A country which is relatively abundant in labour would, e.g., specialize in products with labour 
demanding production, since the greater supply of workers depresses wages and thus production costs.  
Building on this argument, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that free trade will be detrimental for groups 
controlling relatively scarce factors of production, while it is beneficial for groups controlling relatively 
abundant factors of production.16 Since skilled labour in the developed countries is relatively abundant in 
comparison with the rest of the world, while unskilled labour in the developed world is relatively scarce, 
increased trade would, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, widen the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers in the developed world. The step into a world market is thus said to have increase inequality 
as international competition have increased and unskilled labour, compared with skilled labour, in developed 
countries have drawn the short straw when demand for their services have decreased. 17  
In line with these predicted consequences of increased international trade, the factor prize equalization 
theorem states that when production shifts towards products in which the factors of production are abundant in 
a country factor prices between the trading partners will tend to equalize. This increased production will 
increase demand of the factors needed for production and thus equalizing the differences in factor prizes 
between the trading parts.18 Trade with low-wage countries is thereby said by critics to undermine wage levels 
                                                     
13 Baldwin, Martin (1999) p. 1 
14 Mahler (2004) p. 1028  
15 Richardson (1995) p.34 
16 Stolper. Samuelson (1941) p.73 
17 Wood (1994) p. 77 
18 Samuelson (1948) p. 165 
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in developed countries, since when for example differences in labour prices equalizes, the wages in the 
developed countries drop.19 
On the other hand, a large of literature has only found a weak relationship between growing inequality and 
globalisation (e.g. Mahler, 2004; OECD 2011, Richardson 1995). Supporters of free trade argue that increased 
international trade has fuelled economic growth by stimulating national economies, which in turn have 
benefited every income group. Especially pressure on lower prices, created by international competition is 
said to be beneficial to low-income-earners, since high income groups consume a smaller proportion of their 
income than low income groups, the relative benefits of lower prices should benefit low income groups 
more.20  
The second way in which globalization might influence income inequality is through migration. Since the 
1960s the global migrant stock have increased from 92 million to 165 million in 2000 and similarly to 
international trade, rising immigration is argued to have a positive relationship with rising inequality.21 
Economist Gordon H. Hanson states in his book “Why Does Immigration Divide America” (2005) that one 
source of political opposition to immigration stems from that the benefits from immigration are not equally 
redistributed. The income of US residents are increased as a consequence of immigration allowing US firms to 
better utilize domestic resources, but these benefits are not shared equally among the citizens.22 An increase in 
immigration would according to the supply and demand framework put downward pressure on wages for 
those who compete with immigrant over jobs. Those who employ immigrants would on the other hand enjoy 
benefits from cheaper labour, which could increase the gap in income distribution even further.23 Since there 
is a predominance of low skilled workers among the migration flows from developing countries to developed 
countries, increasing immigration should thus be detrimental for low skilled workers in developed countries, 
as competition increases which might increase income inequality in the receiving country.24 
The effect of increased immigration flows from low- to high income countries  is similar to the  effect of 
increased international trade, as international differences in factor prizes equalizes when the global labour is 
changed as a result of workers migrating from labour-abundant countries to labour-scarce countries.25 The 
increased supply of unskilled workers in the developed countries thus depresses the domestic wage level for 
unskilled workers, widening the gap between skilled and unskilled workers.  
                                                     
19 Krugman, Lawrence (1993) p.12  
20 Mahler (2004) p. 1027 
21 Özden, Parsons, Schiff & Walmsley (2012) p.35 
22 Hanson (2005) p.36 
23 Borjas (2006) p.2 
24 According to [Hanson (2005) p.3] 33 percent of all foreign-born adults in the United States had less than 12 years of 
education, compared to 13 percent of all native-born adults. 
25 Hanson (2010) p. 4364 
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However, in “Why Does Immigration Divided America?” economist Gordon H. Hanson raises some important 
differences between immigration and international trade.26 The effect of migration is more complex than the 
effect of increased trade. In addition to the effect on labour markets, immigration may have an even larger 
effect on society since immigrants, use public services, pay taxes and sometimes vote. Immigrants thereby 
affect the income inequality in the receiving country both by influencing the labour market and by effecting 
government taxes and transfers, and thus may have an effect both on pre-tax and post-tax inequality.27  
Contrary to the claim that immigration influences pre-tax and post-tax inequality, studies have found that 
immigration has a small economic impact on the wages, taxes and transfers for the native population and that 
immigration on average is beneficial for the native population.28 
The third way in which increased economic globalisation can influence domestic income inequality is by the 
effects of foreign direct investment and creation of multinational enterprises. The traditional argument of the 
effect of FDI on economic inequality is that low skilled jobs in, e.g. the manufacturing sector are moved 
abroad to developing countries, resulting in increased economic inequality through declining domestic wages 
and unemployment.29  
The Heckscher Ohlin-theorem of international trade states that increased foreign investment causes a decline 
in exports of domestic firms, as these exports might be replaced by products from foreign affiliates. Hence, 
the growing number of multinational enterprises could be argued to have a negative impact on a country’s 
exports. At the same time the investments abroad uses capital that could be invested in the domestic economy. 
In addition to these effects, which are similar to those of increased international trade, multinationals 
enterprises access to labour overseas is predicted to make these companies more elastic in their demand for 
labour and thus their bargaining power towards unions increase.30 
 Taken together, increased FDI is thought to put downward pressure on wages and to increased 
unemployment, both by increased competition but also from companies gaining leverage in wage 
negotiations. However, the interpretation of these possibilities differ widely, as some economists claim that 
domestic workers can be compensated with requirements on firms to share their profits from expanded 
operations with the employees.31 The true effect of increased foreign investment remains an unsettled issue as 
does the question if FDI increases exports and if investments abroad are substitutes for domestic investment.32  
Increasing financial openness i.e. the increased ability to move capital across borders, is the final potential 
contributing factor of globalization to increasing income inequality. International financial flows are claimed 
                                                     
26 Hanson (2005) p. 3 
27 Hanson (2005) p.4 
28 Card, Dustmann & Preston p.34 
29 Baldwin (1995) p. 1 
30 Caves (1996) p.132 
31 Mahler (2004) p. 1029 
32 Baldwin (1995) p.49 
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to reduce policymaker’s possibilities to combat unemployment with traditional stimulative macroeconomic 
policies.33 The increased financial openness is also argued to have made it less complicated for corporations to 
evade domestic taxes, thereby causing a decline in government incomes, which thus reduces the ability of the 
government to redistribute. Similar to the ‘race to the bottom' concept, Pierson (2001) states that when 
competition between countries is intensified governments will try to defend position on international markets 
by limiting domestic public expenditures and social benefits and lowering taxes. The logic behind the ‘race to 
the bottom’ argument is that when there is no restrictions for enterprises to relocate their business to countries 
where costs are lower, competition between countries increases. This forces governments to weaken 
regulations regarding safety, health and environmental issues to create more flexible labour markets, if 
governments wish to keep tax revenues from these enterprises.34  Financial openness might have a negative 
impact on low-income groups, which when the government’s ability to finance social benefits decline, as the 
increased financial openness may put downward pressure on the tax levels, but may also have a positive 
impact for those who succeed in profiting on the increased financial openness which may well widen the 
income distribution.35 This might have an effect on pre-tax inequality, if it affects the reservation wage of 
workers. 
2.2.2 Technological Change 
The technological progress during the last century is commonly considered to have favoured skilled workers 
in the developed world, while reducing the demand for unskilled manual workers.36 The pattern of wages and 
returns to schooling in the United States indicates that technical changes during the past recent decades have 
been increasingly skill-biased.37 
The skill-biased technical change hypothesis builds on the observation that income inequality has risen 
significantly since the 1980s, which coincides with the invention of the microchip and entry of computers on 
the labour market. This technological development resulted in an increase in relative demand for high-skilled 
workers on behalf of low-skilled workers, which caused rising income inequality in the US in the 1980s.38   
Contrary to economist Daron Acemoglu’s findings, other studies have found little evidence about the effects 
of technological changes on income inequality. Economists David Card and John E. DiNardo found that even 
though computer technology has developed rapidly since the 1980s the rise in income inequality in the United 
States has not intensified but rather enfeebled. Card and DiNardo instead propose factors such as changes in 
minimum wages and deunionzation as explanatory variables for the 1980s rise in income inequality, which are 
discussed in section 2.2.1.39 
                                                     
33 Mahler (2004) p. 1030 
34 Castles (2004) p.2 
35 Mahler (2004) p. 1030 
36 Acemoglu (2002) p. 7 
37 Acemoglu (2002) p. 11 
38 Card, DiNardo (2002) p.734 
39 Card, DiNardo (2002) p.776 
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In line with Acemoglu’s observation, a recent report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have found that the earnings gap between high- and low-skilled workers has been 
growing over the past three decades.40 During this period wage dispersion increased in a majority of the 
observed OECD countries, for example the earnings gap between the richest and poorest 10% of full time 
workers in the United States rose from 3.8 times in the beginning of the observations in 1980 to almost 5 
times in 2008.41  However the report points out that there is a problem with separating the effect of 
technological change from effect of the previously mentioned globalisation patterns, which are also 
considered to increase the value of skills.42  
2.3 Domestic Explanations 
2.3.1 Regulatory Reforms and deunionization  
Among the domestic explanations for rising inequality, the concept of institutional change is perhaps the most 
prominent. Labour market institutions, such as unions, minimum wage laws etc. are considered to hinder 
rising inequality by increasing collective bargaining power. But unions do not only strive after a larger market 
income for their members but are also considered to influence social expenditures, and are thus thought to 
have a negative association with both pre-tax and post-tax inequality.43 However, economists such as Daron 
Acemoglu argue that the timing and extent of deunionization suggest that even though it may be an important 
factor for determining the level and structure of wages, it is not the major driving force of increasing 
inequality.44 The rapid increase in pre-tax inequality in both the United States and the United Kingdom 
predates the beginning of deunionization trends, while for example Canada, between the 1960s and 1980s 
experienced rising wage inequality while unions grew stronger. Pre-tax inequality has also, during the same 
time period, risen in occupations who have never to a large degree been affected by unions. Acemoglu instead 
suggests that technological change may be a possible explanation for the deunionization. If unions strive to 
compress wage differences between skilled and unskilled workers, the benefits of unions will decline for 
skilled workers as their wages increase. As unions become less attractive for skilled workers, their bargaining 
power decreases, thereby reinforcing the effect of skill-bias and resulting in a decline of wages for unskilled 
workers.45 
The notion that the decisions of policymakers influence the level of inequality in society raises the issue of 
reversed causality. Policymakers’ decisions on e.g. minimum wage laws, unionization laws or tax policy 
might definitely affect the level of pre-tax inequality in a country. Previous research has shown that e.g. 
marginal tax rates has a negative impact on pre-tax inequality, as the incentives for top earners to work more 
                                                     
40 OECD (2011) p.86 
41 OECD (2011) p.86 
42 OECD (2011) p.28 
43 Mahler (2004) p. 1031, Acemoglu (2002) p.51 
44 Acemoglu (2002) p. 50 
45 Acemoglu (2002) p.51  
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are decreased.46 Under the assumption that right wing parties are more associated with more lenient labour 
market regulations and lower tax rates, a higher right party vote share might thus have an effect on pre-tax 
inequality, which would make our measure of inequality of endogenous, i.e. inequality does not affect demand 
for redistribution, but rather demand for redistribution instead affects inequality. However, using pre-tax 
inequality as our explanatory variable should be methodologically sounder than using post-tax inequality, 
which is completely endogenous, when we want to study the effects of inequality on demand for 
redistribution. This problem of reversed causality is of course a serious methodological issue, which must be 
kept in mind. A more detailed discussion of using pre-tax or post-tax inequality is found in section 4.2 and on 
the determinants of post-tax inequality is available in A.2 in the appendix. 
However, assuming that the problem of reversed causality is more critical for our first measure of demand for 
redistribution i.e. as right party vote share, this problem might be levitated somewhat by also including our 
other measure of demand for redistribution based on survey data, since the effect of demand for redistribution 
on pre-tax inequality measured with survey data might not be as direct as right party vote share. 
3. Impacts of Inequality on Demand for Redistribution 
The determinants of demand for redistribution have been subject to a fairly intense study within economics 
and other social sciences.47 In this study we are not interested in the determinants of redistribution as such but 
primarily the effect of inequality which has been somewhat neglected in the literature.48 Below two different 
theoretical arguments on the effect of inequality on demand for redistribution are presented. We also examine 
a literature that focus on a somewhat different issue that relates to inequality, but nevertheless is relevant to 
keep in mind. This literature is called POUM (Prospect of Upward Mobility) and focus on social mobility 
instead of economic inequality. 
3.1 Channels of Impact 
3.1.1 The Median voter theorem 
In much of the work on the relationship between inequality and redistribution economists Meltzer and 
Richard’s model building on Romer (1975) is the obvious point of departure. In the seminal article “A rational 
theory of the size of government” published in the Journal of Political Economy, Meltzer and Richard 
formulate a model attempting to provide theoretical basis for the size of government measured as the level of 
                                                     
46 Roine et al (2009) 
47 There are of course a variety of explanations other than inequality important in trying to explain demand for 
redistribution.To name but a few examples, an individual history of misfortune affecting risk-aversion has been shown to 
have an effect (Piketty 1995), cultural norms emphasizing equality vs. individualism (Alesina & Glaeser 2004), the 
structure and organization of the family affects people’s risk exposure and thus affect people’s preferences for 
government intervention (Alesina & Guilianio 2009), income matters as people with higher income become more 
negative towards government redistribution and women seem to have a more positive inclination for government 
redistribution (Alesina & Giuliano 2009) and also perceptions of fairness i.e. if income is acquired by luck or by effort 
matters (Piketty 1995) 
48 Finseraas (2009) p. 98 
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social spending.49 The main argument is that in a country with universal franchise and majority rule, “the 
voter with the median income is decisive in single issues election” i.e. in an election where the political debate 
focuses only on issues of redistribution, the equilibrium level of taxation and redistribution will be decided by 
the voter with the median income and thus will optimize the utility of the median voter, assuming universal 
turnout.50 What then constitutes the equilibrium level of taxation and redistribution according to Meltzer and 
Richard? This is primarily dependent on the distance between the income of the median voter and the mean 
income in a given society (which we can think of as a rough measure of economic inequality) but also on that 
individuals are aware of the effect of the tax rate on disincentives (lowering the labour supply), assuring that 
redistribution will not be total.51 Formally, the optimal tax rate for the decisive voter is equal to the ratio of 
mean to median income.52 Richard and Meltzer state that income distributions generally are skewed to the 
right, i.e. that the mean income is higher than the median income, and that “the [equilibrium] tax rate rises as 
mean income rises relative to the income of the decisive voter, and taxes fall as [the mean income] falls”. 
The proposed explanation of the level of redistribution in society offered by Richard and Meltzer is beautiful 
in its simplicity and intuition. For the model to hold, the voters’ must base their voting decision only on their 
economic self-interest i.e. if they would gain from increased redistribution.53 However, the most critical 
assumption of the model is the assumption of full electoral turnout, which is necessary for the voter with the 
median income to be the decisive voter. If voting in democratic elections is less common amongst the poor 
and low-educated, the distribution of income in the electorate might not be identical to the income distribution 
in the population. If increasing inequality is a result of the poorest are getting even poorer, and this group vote 
to a lesser extent, this increased inequality may not translate into increased demand for redistribution in the 
electorate.  
This process might be strengthened by factors such as migration, which might be associated with both higher 
levels of inequality, as discussed 2.1.1, and lower electoral turnout, if migrants vote to a lesser extent than 
natives. Most often immigrants are not allowed to vote at all (as they are not citizens), or might only vote in 
municipal elections which may be less relevant for redistribution issues.54 However, immigrants are still 
agents in the economy, and therefore have an impact on the mean income but not on the wage of the decisive 
voter. If immigrants are, on average, poorer than the national citizens, this should have a negative impact on 
the mean income, which then decreases the distance between the income of the median voter and the mean 
income, which should reduce the median voter’s demand for redistribution. Hence, as the assumption in the 
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median voter theorem of universal franchise may not be fulfilled in any of our sample countries, we would 
expect this to weaken the relationship between pre-tax inequality and demand for redistribution in the 
electorate.  
However, in this paper, we do not focus on whether increasing inequality actually leads to higher levels of 
redistribution, but on how demand for redistribution is affected by rising inequality. Important to note is that 
our survey measure of demand for redistribution also includes persons who are normally not allowed to vote 
such as immigrants, whilst these are excluded from our second measurement of demand for redistribution. 
Thus, if the political mechanism is the Achilles’ heel of the median voter theorem, we might find a stronger 
relationship between inequality and demand for redistribution for our survey measure than for the right party 
vote share measure, as it comes closer to the assumption of universal suffrage.  
From the median voter theorem, we can construct the following hypothesis of the effect of inequality on 
demand for redistribution: 
H1: As pre-tax inequality increases, demand for redistribution will also increase. 
The median voter theorem, or Meltzer-Richard model, has been subject to some empirical testing and received 
mixed support. Milanovic (2001) conducted one of the earliest tests of the median voter theory using proper 
data (data on pre-tax inequality in a cross-country setting was first available with the Luxembourg Income 
Study Project). He examined redistribution and pre-tax inequality for 24 affluent democracies in the OECD 
between roughly 1970-2000, and did find that more unequal countries do redistribute, measured as the 
difference between the pre-tax and post-tax Gini, more. However, he found only weak support for the median 
voter theorem when in detail econometrically examining the effect of cash transfers, which hardly should 
benefit a gainfully employed median voter, and finds a strong positive statistical association. It seems like 
demand for redistribution increases even more than the median voter theorem suggest, which might be due to 
long-term gains of the middle class of increased transfers or other motives driving their behavior.55 Also, 
Milanovic fails to control for the rate of unemployment, which may inflate the level of redistribution. Moene 
and Wallerstein (2001), on the other hand, find a negative correlation between inequality and a social 
insurance as a proxy for redistribution for 18 affluent OECD countries between 1980 and 1995. However, 
Moene and Wallersteins econometrical estimation is lacking and their results may be biased by unobservables, 
since they do not employ any fixed effect estimation. Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005), using LIS and OECD 
data and defining redistribution in line with Milanovic, find a strong positive relationship between inequality 
and redistribution. However, the econometric strategy is also lacking several important control variables such 
as the percentage elderly in the economy and does not use fixed effects estimation. Iversen and Soskice (2006) 
measures redistribution in the same way as the previous authors and examines 17 affluent OECD countries 
between roughly 1980-2000. They find no effect of pre-tax inequality on redistribution but also fail to control 
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for time constant unobservables, which may well bias their findings. Finally, Kenworthy and McCall do not 
use any econometric estimation at all but instead study the effect of pre-tax inequality on spending on a 
number of different social policies descriptively, and find no obvious relationship between inequality and 
spending for 9 affluent democracies within the OECD. Kenworthy and McCall point out that there are 
considerable methodological problems in trying to distinguish the effects of voter preferences on the level of 
redistribution from the automatic compensatory effect of tax and transfers following changes in the business 
cycle, and also that social spending may increase because of a greater number of people receiving transfers 
and not because of increased generosity per se, which is why it is important to control for e.g. the 
unemployment rate in the economy.56 However, as they do not perform any econometric estimations, their 
examinations are most probably subject to omitted variable bias.  
Thus, the empirical findings are mixed, and also not one study seems fully satisfactory from a methodological 
perspective. They also differ in the choice of measures of redistribution and research design, which of course 
contributes to the mixed findings. Still, most studies on the median voter theorem have focused on whether 
greater market inequality leads to higher levels of social spending, thus ignoring the second step in the 
causality chain. It is possible that increasing inequality leads to higher levels of demand for redistribution, but 
that Richard and Meltzer’s account of the political process/mechanism is too simplistic, and that increasing 
demand for redistribution does not translate into increased social spending because of, e.g., 
multidimensionality of democratic election or other unknown factors.57 The possibly over-simplistic political 
mechanism is also a serious methodological issue for our study, as the measurement of demand for 
redistribution as right-party vote share relies heavily on the assumption that changes in demand for 
redistribution translates into changes in support for right-wing parties. However, as this is not our only 
measure and the survey measure is independent of the political mechanism, the research design of this study 
could provide some tentative answers on whether it is the failure of the political mechanism of the median 
voter theorem that is the cause of the mixed findings. 
Even though issues of redistribution is a central dividing line between left and right in western democracies, it 
is not the only issue being handled in modern elections. Thus, if issues other than redistribution are more 
important to the voters (or if the elections are not single issue elections at all), it is possible that even if higher 
inequality produced a higher demand for redistribution, this would not show in government spending and 
transfers due to the fact that political parties prioritize other issues in election to win over voters. 
Another limitation of the model is that it does not consider the possibility that the voters’ base their 
preferences of the level of redistribution on ideas of fairness or other normative grounds, i.e. ideological 
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voting, instead of pure monetary self-interest.58 It is also this notion of rationality in Richard and Meltzer’s 
model that MacRae criticize in his development of the social distance model discussed in 3.1.2. 
Still, most of this critique concerns why it is reasonable to doubt that the increased inequality must result in 
increased social spending. It might be that increased inequality produces an increased demand for 
redistribution, even though this increased demand may not be matched by the supply of redistribution offered 
by the political parties. 
Only a handful of studies have explicitly empirically examined the association between inequality and 
demand for redistribution. Economists Bowles and Gintis (2000) do not find a positive relationship between 
market inequality and support for the welfare state (as a proxy for demand for redistribution) for eight 
developed countries in 1995, instead there seems to be a negative relationship. However, the authors only 
assess this relationship graphically and do not perform any econometrical modeling.  
Lübker (2007) finds no statistically significant correlation between inequality, measured as the Gini index post 
tax and transfers from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and from Eurostat, and demand for redistribution, 
measured as the fraction of population agreeing with the statement “It is the responsibility of the government 
to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes” from the 
ISSP wave of 1999 for 21 developed countries.59 
Finseraas (2008) finds support for the median voter theorem using cross-sectional data from the European 
Social Survey from 1999 data for 22 European countries and multilevel modeling in assessing the 
relationship. However, contradictory to the theorem, Finseraas uses the post-tax Gini as the measurement of 
inequality and also uses data from both the Luxembourg Income Study and the Deininger & Squire database, 
thus damaging the cross-sectional comparability between countries, especially as the accuracy of the 
inequality measurements provided by the Deininger and Squire data is questionable.60 Using the post-tax 
measure of inequality obviously introduces the problem of reverse causality, i.e. that the post-tax Gini 
coefficient reflects increased demand for redistribution and not the other way around.61 Finseraas does find 
that demand for redistribution increases with inequality and also that an interaction between personal income 
and inequality is statistically and economically significant.62 However, using data from only one year is 
problematic, as the findings may be caused by unit heterogeneity. Widening the analysis time frame and thus 
incorporating the change in inequality within countries over time might provide a more convincing test of the 
formal model. Finseraas also includes three post-communist countries in his sample, which may not be 
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directly comparable with the other developed countries because of the communist regime, which has been 
shown to influence individual preferences for redistribution.63 
 Kenworthy & McCall (2007), on the other hand, find no support for the median voter theorem using survey 
data from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP). However, they do not carry out any econometrical 
testing. The relationship between inequality and demand for redistribution is studied by examining 
scatterplots. In addition, Kenworthy and McCall only examine this relationship for eight nations, for which 
they have longer time series available. They use both pre- and post-tax inequality in assessing the relationship. 
Kenworthy and McCall measures demand for redistribution with the aggregated mean response value to the 
question “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with 
high income and those with low income”. They also state that they do not find much support for the model, 
i.e. demand for redistribution seems to be unresponsive to changes in both inequality measures.  However, this 
may be due to the fact that they measure aggregated demand for redistribution as a mean (the response scale 
ranges only from 0 to 5). Thus, increased demand for redistribution in certain groups may be offset by 
decreased demand in other group – a polarization that is masked by using the mean value. Hence, the usage of 
demand for redistribution as an aggregated mean value may obscure relevant changes in the population and is 
therefore not an ideal measurement. In addition, the absence of econometrical modeling and also the limited 
sample renders the conclusions drawn by Kenworthy and McCall somewhat unconvincing. 
Hence, in light of the conflicting findings of previous studies, there seem to be convincing reasons for further 
study of the median voter theorem. In addition, the latest data used in the cited articles is from 2000 and, as 
inequality has increased since then it seems reasonable to test the median voter theorem once again using new 
data and more reliable econometric techniques. 
3.1.2 The Social Distance Model 
In his doctoral thesis, political scientist Duncan MacRae claims that the median voter theorem fails to hold up 
in practice and instead proposes a modified version it: the social distance model.64 The main idea of the social 
distance model is straightforward and focuses on a different kind of rationality of the decisive voter.65 A large 
part of the cross-sectional redistribution targets a minority of the population such as the poor or the 
unemployed. Further, it is reasonable to assume the decisive voter will be gainfully employed and 
consequently differ from the median transfer recipient in several aspects and also not receive much direct 
benefit from these transfers. The key assumption of the theory is that “[p]eople generally […] support benefits 
for people like themselves; or for those who “deserve” support because they have fallen on hard times through 
no fault of their own”.66 In line with this, the main prediction of the theory is that the median voter’s demand 
for redistribution will decrease with increasing pre-tax inequality. This since the “social distance”, i.e., the 
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socioeconomic differences, between the median voter and the median welfare recipient will increase with 
increasing pre-tax inequality. Since people are assumed to support benefits for people like themselves and the 
similarities between the median voter and the median welfare recipient decrease with increasing inequality, 
the median voter is thought to identify even less with the median welfare recipient.67 This increased social 
distance is then thought to translate into a decreased demand for redistribution of the median voter.68 
However, for this to hold, the identification of the median voter with the median welfare recipient must be 
understood as a continuous rather than a binary variable, which increases with decreasing economic 
inequality. If this is not the case, we would not expect increased market inequality to decrease demand for 
redistribution, as the median voter will still be gainfully employed and probably not gain a great deal 
economically from increased redistribution. 
MacRae claims that economic inequality is a proxy for social distance and also uses summary measures of 
inequality to test the model. It is however clear that the social distance is not economic inequality in itself, but 
rather that the median voter’s perception of the social distance to the median welfare recipient that is the key 
variable. Thus, an ideal proxy for this would not be an overall measurement of economic inequality but 
instead a measurement focusing on the distance between the median voter and the median welfare recipient. 
MacRae, however, does not propose such a measure. We know that e.g. the Gini coefficient places heavier 
weight on the changes in the middle of the income distribution (see section 4.1) and also that it does not focus 
particularly on how many individuals that have no market income i.e. are living on transfers which is 
important for the social distance model, and we would therefore not expect this measure of economic 
inequality to be particularly good at capturing the mechanism behind the model. Basically, all conventional 
measures of economic inequality focuses on inequality of income, but when examining the social distance 
model, it is clear that we would need a measure focusing more on the distance between median welfare 
recipient, who lacks market income, and the median voter. 
According to MacRae, the proposition made of Alesina et al (2003) that ethnic fractionalization should 
decrease demand for redistribution, can thus be interpreted as a form of social distance, since ethnic 
fractionalization increases the differences between the median voter and the median welfare recipient if a 
certain ethnic group is overrepresented among the poor. 
Even though we focus on the effects of economic inequality on demand for redistribution in this paper, the 
social distance model also makes predictions on the effect of changes in the rate of unemployment. We 
include this as this gives us yet another hypothesis of the social distance model, which may be helpful when 
testing the theory empirically. The rate of unemployment is thought to have an effect on demand for 
redistribution in the opposite direction of inequality. As the rate of unemployment rises in the economy, 
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MacRae argues, it should increase the likelihood of an unemployed individual to be perceived as a victim of 
unlucky circumstances rather than being lazy and undeserving. It should also increase the likelihood that the 
median voter itself will need government assistance.69 However, contrary to MacRae’s predictions, it is also 
possible that high levels of unemployment may lead to decreased demand for redistribution of the median 
voter because of the rising costs of transfers to the unemployed, especially as it is reasonable to assume that 
the median voter will still be employed. 
MacRae also finds that increased pre-tax inequality has a negative effect on demand for redistribution in the 
US and that unemployment has a positive effect when assessing this relationship with survey data from the 
American National Election Studies between 1980 and 2005.70 He also finds this for eight countries, all 
Anglophone except for Norway and Austria, using the ISSP survey and difference estimation between 1992 
and 1999 measuring demand for redistribution with the question “It is the responsibility of the government to 
reduce differences in income between people with high incomes and low incomes”, modeling the relationship 
at the individual level with the change in market inequality as the key explanatory variable.71 However, for the 
cross-sectional regressions, inequality is measured as a Theil ratio, which is not strictly comparable between 
countries and only focuses on earnings inequality in the manufacturing industry which may very well differ 
from inequality in the whole population. It is thus not a satisfying measure of economic inequality and the 
sample selection also allows one to doubt the generality and external validity of the results for the whole 
population.  
However, MacRae does not only suggest that increasing inequality should lead to decreased demand for 
redistribution, but also that increasing inequality produce a more conservative electorate, since left parties are 
generally associated with more generous benefits programs and social policy.72 Hence, less demand for 
redistribution is thought to translate into less demand for the policies traditionally associated with left parties, 
which then is thought to advantage right parties. He tests this hypothesis on US data and finds that increasing 
inequality seems to drive the voters towards more conservative standpoints. As this argument is derived 
directly from the social distance model, there is no obvious reason to expect that this relationship would not 
hold for other affluent democracies besides the US. This has to our knowledge not been put to test empirically 
when measured as electoral support for right-wing parties in the literature. Instead, a few studies have 
examined the effect of increasing inequality on party rhetoric and reached conflicting conclusions on whether 
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parties become more conservative in the face of increasing inequality.73 We instead aim to test if increasing 
inequality may increases the vote share for right-wing parties74 
From the social distance model we can construct the following hypotheses: 
H2a: As pre-tax inequality increases, demand for redistribution will decrease. 
H2b: As unemployment increases, demand for redistribution will increase. 
3.1.3 Social mobility and the POUM hypothesis 
Finally, another exciting literature on demand for redistribution puts both of the models discussed above into 
question. This literature focusing on social mobility in general and the prospect of upwards mobility in 
particular, argues that it is not the level of inequality as such that is relevant when determining demand for 
redistribution, but instead the perception of economic inequality defined as how high or low social mobility is 
and expected future income. This theory is not the principal focus of our examination, but is nonetheless 
important to consider as it is a highly plausible alternative explanation of demand for redistribution and relates 
to the concept of inequality. 
This literature focusing on the political economy of social mobility and future income first formalized by 
Benabou and Ok (2001).75 Benabou and Ok propose yet another alternate take on the R-M model where 
individuals do not only care about their current income, as in the R-M model, but also about future income. 
Allowing for upwards and downwards social mobility and assuming that individuals are not too risk averse 
and that the mobility process is concave in expectations, Benabou and Ok argues that it is possible that “the 
poor do not support high levels of redistribution because of the hope that they, or their offspring, may make it 
up the income ladder.”76 Thus, if individuals believe that they or their offspring will move up the income 
ladder, it may be perfectly rational to demand less redistribution than the levels proposed by the R-M model. 
This is called the POUM (Prospect of Upward Mobility) hypothesis. 
Thus, drawing on the POUM hypothesis framework, we can construct one final hypothesis. 
H3: With increased (perceived) social mobility, demand for redistribution decreases. 
The POUM hypothesis has also gained some empirical support in the literature. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
find that support for redistributive policies decreases with increases in objective measures of future income 
using data from the General Social Survey in the USA between 1978 and 1994. 77 Alesina and Giuliano (2009) 
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also find support for the POUM hypothesis, however, only when social mobility is measured as a difference 
between the occupational prestige of the father and the respondent, also using data from the GSS but 
stretching until 2004.78  
Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) study the effect of upward and downward mobility on demand for redistribution 
in Russia in the 1990s. They find that the prospect of downward mobility, measured through self-assessments, 
has a significant impact on demand for redistribution, even for the currently rich.79 They also find the reversed 
to be true i.e. that increased belief in future upward mobility decreases demand for redistribution significantly. 
Widening the geographical sample, Corneo and Grüner (2002) use data from the ISSP from 1992 for a sample 
of 12 developed countries (notably, however, neither the UK nor the US is included in the sample) find that 
intergenerational upward mobility, measured with a question of if the respondent is better off than his/hers 
father, does have a negative effect on demand for redistribution.80 
Checchi and Filippin (2003) also find support for the POUM hypothesis, i.e. that demand for redistribution 
decreases with increasing social mobility, using experimental design and varying the upward mobility of the 
transition matrices as experimental manipulation. The participants in the experiment were asked to specify 
their level of preferred taxation and Checchi and Filippin found that “preferred taxation declines when the 
transition matrices are characterized by the prospect of upward mobility”.81  
3.1.4 A note on right wing party vote share and the median voter theorem 
In this study, we employ two measures of demand for redistribution: right wing party vote share and a survey 
question aimed to capture the respondents’ attitude towards government redistribution. In the former case, we 
make the crucial assumption that, as right wing parties should be less identified with social insurance program 
and government redistribution, increased demand for redistribution should disadvantage them in the electoral 
competition. However, using this as a measure of government redistribution cannot strictly be derived from 
the formal argument of the median voter theorem made by Meltzer and Richard. The main prediction of the 
median voter theorem is that if the parties are vote-maximizing, they will both adjust their policies to the 
median voter. Hence, the median voter theorem predicts that there would be no great differences between the 
parties, at least in terms of the supply of government redistribution offered. In order for us to make the 
argument that right wing party vote share is a reasonable – indirect – measurement of demand for 
redistribution, we need to make the assumption that there in fact is differences between right and left wing 
parties in terms of redistribution and, if both right and left wing parties adjust themselves to the demand of the 
median voter, this does not happen instantly. If this assumption does not hold, we would expect to find no 
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effect of inequality on right wing party vote share. However, the rationality of the individual voter is in no 
sense altered from the original model. 
4. Measures of Economic Inequality 
To examine the relationship between demand for redistribution and economic inequality econometrically we 
clearly are in need of a measurement of economic inequality. Even though the concept of economic inequality 
is strongly associated with the Gini coefficient, there are a variety of different measurements of inequality that 
could be used in the analysis. This section will contain a brief discussion of the most common measure of, the 
Gini coefficient, following the five desirable axioms Cowell (2001) stipulated for measurements of economic 
inequality. For a more detailed discussion of the possible alternative measures of inequality that we chose not 
to use, see section A.3 in the appendix. 
4.1 The Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality 
Although the Gini coefficient is the most well-known and widely used measurement of inequality there are a 
variety of possible different measurements to choose from. However, in practice, the usage of a certain 
measurement must be determined by the research question at hand. 
The Gini coefficient fulfills the first three of the five desirability criteria Cowell stipulated for all measures of 
economic inequality: a Pigou-Dalton transfer always reduces inequality (weak principle of transfers), the level 
of inequality is independent of the scale or monetary measure (income scale dependence) and the level of 
inequality is independent of the number of individuals in the society (principle of population). However, it is 
not possible to express inequality in terms of inequality in and between subgroups in society82 
(decomposability) and a Pigou-Dalton transfer’s reduction of inequality does not only depend on the distance 
between two individuals, but also on where in the income distribution this transfer takes place (strong 
principle of transfers). This is because the Gini, as a consequence of its construction, places more weight on 
changes in the center of the income distribution than at the extremes, which might be problematic for the 
social distance model as discussed in 3.2.1.83 The main strength of the Gini is its comparability, which allows 
us to directly compare two different societies in terms of inequality. This is not true for other entropy 
measures of inequality such as the Theil index, which is not always comparable between countries.84 It is also 
a full-information measure, i.e. it takes the whole distribution of income in society into account.85 However, as 
the Gini is a relative measure standardized between 1 and 0, it can only be understood empirically in context. 
Neither does it tell us much about the structure of inequality which e.g. ratios do. With the aim of the paper in 
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mind, i.e. examining the effect of increasing inequality on demand for redistribution, it may be that the key 
aspect is not the level of inequality but the structure, such as the distance between the median voter and the 
median welfare recipient, or that concentration of income among the upper-middle class and the rich may be 
particularly salient when individuals consider their preferences for redistribution.  
A variety of differing distributions of income could be represented by the same Gini coefficient, although the 
structure of inequality in these societies may very well differ substantially when closely examined.86 
Consequently, a constant Gini coefficient does not necessarily mean that inequality is constant, but rather that 
the “overall” inequality in society is constant. This may also suppress the amount of variation in the variable 
compared to other measures, but this might also be compensated by the fact that the Gini is a full-information 
measure. 
Hence, even though the Gini coefficient does not satisfy all five of Cowell’s desirable properties, it should be 
a better summary measure of economic inequality than ratios or share, since it considers the whole income 
distribution. A consequence might therefore be that the Gini is better suited for testing the median voter 
theorem than the social distance model. Still, its property of comparability renders it extremely useful in 
cross-country research. However, alternative measures such as ratios and shares can be important in telling us 
something about the structure of inequality, as described in A.3.2. 
4.2 Pre-tax or post-tax inequality? 
A final aspect when determining which measure of inequality is the most suitable concerns if the measure 
should be post- or pre-tax. The median voter theorem clearly departs from pre-tax inequality and this is also 
suggested by MacRae to be the relevant measure for the social distance model.  The pre-tax inequality 
measure seems to have quite a few advantages compared to the post-tax measure: (i) it is more clearly rooted 
in the median voter theorem, (ii) it makes it easier to disentangle the effect of inequality on redistribution, as 
pre-tax inequality obviously precedes redistribution and (iii) logically, individuals ought to make a decision on 
their preferred level of redistribution based on their gross income. It is, however, harder to find data on pre-tax 
inequality than post-tax inequality. Post-tax inequality, in turn, is (i) methodologically more complicated to 
use and is reasonably more highly at risk of being endogenous but (ii) post-tax inequality is nevertheless the 
level of inequality that individuals face in their daily life and (iii) there is more data available.  
It is also not obvious why social distance, as argued by MacRae, should have a stronger relationship with pre-
tax inequality than post-tax inequality. If social distance is to be understood as a socioeconomic distance 
between individuals, why is pre-tax and not post-tax inequality the best proxy for social distance? Still, the 
pre-tax measure is more reliable to use when we contemplate our research questions: the effect of economic 
inequality on redistribution, and reduces the methodological problems considerably. Disentangling the effect 
of post-tax inequality on demand for redistribution seems to be a very difficult from an econometric point of 
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view and might well be endogenous. However, as it is possible that post-tax inequality really does matter for 
the demand for redistribution, we provide the econometric results with post-tax inequality as explanatory 
variable in section A.8 in the appendix. 
5. Data quality and descriptive statistics 
5.1 Inequality data 
The inequality data provided by the Luxembourg Income Study project (LIS) are often considered to be the 
most reliable measure of inequality available today.87 This is because the LIS key figures (e.g. Gini 
coefficients) are all constructed from micro data provided by the national statistic agencies with the aim of 
enabling cross-country comparisons. This enables the construction of standardized measurements of 
inequality constructed according to a common definition, greatly improving the possibility to compare 
inequality over time and between countries.88 Unfortunately, the LIS has not yearly observations of Gini 
coefficients but collects data in waves. Thus, the number of time points are quite few and more importantly, it 
has not observations for all countries in our sample. As we would like an inequality measure that covers our 
whole sample and ideally with regular observations for the entire time period, we need to consider using 
measures of inequality provided by other sources.  
Three possible sources of inequality data, from the OECD, the World Bank and the University of Texas 
Inequality Project (UTIP) were considered. However, Brandolini and Atkinson (2001) have already concluded 
that the Deringer and Squire dataset provided by the World Bank is unreliable. Still, the quality of the OECD 
and UTIP data was uncertain, and we assessed the quality of our different measures of inequality by using the 
LIS Gini as a benchmark. Our assessment, presented in table 5.1, show that the OECD measure of inequality 
has a much stronger correlation with the LIS data than the UTIP data. We therefore only present the results for 
the OECD data here, whilst a detailed description of the World Bank and UTIP data and the results from the 
assessment of the UTIP data is available in section A.3.4 in the appendix. 
5.1.1 Assessing the quality of inequality data 
The OECD provide data on income inequality both based on disposable household income (i.e. post-tax and 
transfers) and household earnings (i.e. pre-tax and transfers) The OECD Gini figures also come from a variety 
of micro sources, just as the LIS, but has also produced its variables according to a common definition aiming 
to enable cross-country comparisons between the OECD countries.89 Thus, we have reasons to believe that the 
cross-country comparability of this data is high and we would also expect it to be quite strongly correlated 
with the LIS data, as it is often constructed from the same raw data. 
                                                     
87 Atkinson (2004) p. 166 
88 Atkinson (2004) p. 173  
Still, as the national statistic agencies do not always collect micro data with the aim of constructing cross-country 
comparable measures of inequality, differences in methodology may also of course affect the LIS measurements. 
89 http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/_README_Income_Surveys&Years.pdf 
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The data quality of these measurements of income inequality is assessed by examining the correlation of these 
variables with the LIS Gini coefficient and by regressing the LIS Gini on the OECD Gini coefficients. As the 
LIS Gini works as our benchmark, we interpret a stronger correlation with the LIS as higher data quality. 
Ideally, we would like the beta coefficient to be as close to 1 as possible. The pooled regression of the OECD 
data on the LIS data has an R-squared of .75 and a beta coefficient of .95, indicating that the OECD and LIS 
data seem have a strong statistical association. 
Let us now turn to the correlations between the LIS Gini and the OECD. Table 5.1 below contains the 
correlations for two distinctive years and for all years pooled together. 
Table 5.1 Correlation matrix between the OECD and the LIS Gini coefficients 
    OECD (post) 
2000 LIS .8671 
 n 15 
1995 LIS .8772 
 n 11 
All years LIS .8668 
  n 34 
Comment: The sample was restricted in the following manner: the inequality measurements had to overlap for individual years (i.e. we did not use 
time windows). The following countries were included: AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, IRE, ITA, LUX, NET, NOR, SPA, 
SWE, CHE, UK and US.  
 
The picture that emerges is much the same as for the pooled regressions examined above. For both samples, 
the OECD Gini is the measurement that is strongly correlated with the LIS Gini. Hence, the Gini data 
provided by the OECD seems to be a credible measurement of economic inequality to use instead of the LIS 
data. 
5.2 Constructing the data sets 
The data sets used to test the theories was constructed in the following manner. We used the Comparative 
Political Data Set I (CPDS) provided by the University of Bern which includes election data for the 23 OECD 
countries included in our sample. The CPDS, however, does not include any data on economic inequality and 
we therefore had to merge the data with the post- and pre-tax Gini coefficients provided by the OECD. 
Unfortunately, the OECD only provide measures approximately every five years on economic inequality, and 
we therefore needed to impute values of economic inequality as they only rarely match the year of an election. 
There are several different ways to impute the data e.g. by moving averages, by filling all previous missing 
values with the most recent value etc. However, as economic inequality is rather sluggish in its evolution, and 
as the inequality data provided by the OECD is not for a certain year such as 2005 but instead described as 
“around mid-00’s”, we chose to impute the inequality data ± 2 years of the actual observation year. 
For the survey data on demand for redistribution from the ESS, we departed from the cumulative ESS file 
containing all respondents, variables and waves included in the ESS. We then merged our macro level 
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variables and used the same strategy when interpolating, e.g., the inequality data as described above. More 
information on the construction of the data set can be found in the appendix under A.4. 
5.3 Descriptive statistics 
In this section we present the first look at the descriptive statistics of the data used to test our hypotheses. This 
overview can provide some insight to tendencies and changes that have occurred over the time period of interest. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that the data presented here are summary statistics at an aggregated 
level, and that caution should be taken before drawing any conclusions of the developments of the observed 
variables since these bivariate associations could suffer from omitted variable bias. Also, the failure to observe 
any changes in the mean values of the variables should not be taken as evidence of no change, as a stable mean 
may well incorporate two trends moving in the opposite direction and cancelling each other out.  
The data on right-wing vote shares originate from the “Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2010”, and 
consist of annual observations for 23 democratic countries during this time period. The variable right_vote is 
the vote share for conservative parties, as defined in the “Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2010”, which is 
one of the most widely used data sets on comparative political data. In cases were there did not exist any 
parties classified as conservative in a country, we chose to include the parties in the country which were 
classified as liberal. The idea behind this is that liberal and conservative parties traditionally both are 
classified as right-wing parties, and thus liberal parties should constitute the mainstream right party alternative 
in countries that are lacking parties classified as conservative.90 They key assumption is that liberal and 
conservative parties are less associated with generous social policies and redistribution than left parties, and 
that their support therefore is affected by the demand for redistribution. The party family classifications in the 
data set were made using expert surveys and building on extensive research within political science on party 
families. The descriptive statistics for right party vote share are found in table 5.2.  
  
                                                     
90 Budge & Fairlie (1983) 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics right-wing party vote share over time 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1975 22 28.34091 15.59691 5.4 54.3 
1976 22 27.90909 15.65956 3.1 54.3 
1977 23 28.68261 14.59566 3.1 50.6 
1978 23 28.28261 14.22388 3.1 50.6 
1979 23 28.37826 15.12872 0 50.6 
1980 23 28.59565 15.23693 0 50.6 
1981 23 28.84783 14.27563 0 47.9 
1982 23 27.35652 14.1982 0 47.9 
1983 23 28.35217 12.74633 5 45.8 
1984 23 29.46522 13.34707 5 50 
1985 23 30.42174 14.15181 5 50 
1986 23 30.47391 13.96744 7 50 
1987 23 30.51739 14.59712 8.4 56.3 
1988 23 29.96087 14.34921 8.4 56.3 
1989 23 30.72609 14.13208 8.4 56.3 
1990 23 31.06957 13.82282 8.4 56.3 
1991 23 31.13478 13.50393 8.4 50.4 
1992 23 30.82609 13.36706 7.3 50.4 
1993 23 29.52826 13.98324 7.3 57.35 
1994 23 31.3913 13.50932 6.9 57.4 
1995 23 30.5 12.87694 6.9 57.4 
1996 23 30.68696 13.33251 6.9 64.3 
1997 23 29.86522 12.84954 6.9 64.3 
1998 23 29.6913 13.39949 6.2 64.3 
1999 23 30.12348 13.22324 6.2 64.3 
2000 23 29.16696 11.93866 6.2 47 
2001 23 29.84522 11.42873 6.2 47 
2002 23 28.89348 13.25788 7.4 50.6 
2003 23 28.35696 13.07251 7.4 50.6 
2004 23 28.56565 12.51531 7.4 49.3 
2005 23 28.76087 12.80184 9.8 49.3 
2006 23 28.87826 12.41952 9.8 45.4 
2007 23 29.16957 12.76777 9.8 51.6 
2008 23 30.34783 12.52637 9.8 51.6 
2009 23 29.3913 11.37301 10.4 51.6 
The changes in right-wing party vote share are observed annually over 35 years, from 1975 to 2009. During 
this period the vote share seem to have remained at a relatively steady level, with a minimum of 27.36 % in 
1982 and maximum of 30.69 % in 1996. 
The data on demand for redistribution are collected from the European Social Survey, which have been 
conducted in five waves from the start in 2002 to 2010. The participants in the surveys were presented with 
the statement, “Government should reduce differences in income”, and were asked to answer to which degree 
they supported the statement. The possible answers range from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), 
where a higher number implies a stronger demand for redistribution.  This is a fairly common 
operationalization of demand for redistribution when measured through surveys (similar measures are 
employed in the International Social Survey Program and the World Values Survey). However it is not free of 
problems, particularly with respect to the comparability across time and space. To answer the question the 
respondents must assess the current level of government redistribution and then determine whether more or 
less of government redistribution is desirable. The obvious problem is that the level of distribution changes 
over time and thus the respondents partly answer these questions with different levels of redistribution in 
mind. The second problem relates to cultural differences when interpreting the phenomena of government 
redistribution. In countries with higher levels of corruption e.g. south European countries, even though a 
respondent may be poor, she may oppose government redistribution because she would not receive any 
benefits from this increased redistribution, as they would be eaten up by the bureaucratic apparatus. In 
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countries with lower levels of corruption e.g. the Nordic countries, this may not be a problem. These societal 
differences may not only produce different average values, but may also distort the correlation between 
demand for redistribution and inequality, even though the mechanisms of the social distance model or the 
median voter theorem may be true. Summary statistics for this variable are presented in table 5.3 
Table. 5.3 Descriptive statistics demand for redistribution over time 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2002 32234 3.745176 1.053068 1 5 
2004 32628 3.773017 1.044728 1 5 
2006 27630 3.749294 1.051436 1 5 
2008 28151 3.79887 1.025002 1 5 
2010 27658 3.823487 1.05516 1 5 
The means displayed in table 5.3 indicates that on an aggregated level, demand for redistribution have 
increased slightly since the first wave of the European Social Survey.  
The developments in inequality, measured by the changes in the aggregated Gini coefficient, pre-tax and 
transfers, provided by the OECD for the countries in our sample, are found in table 5.4. One should also note 
that we have no pre-tax inequality data on Ireland, but only post-tax inequality data. Thus, Ireland will not be 
included in the regression with pre-tax inequality as an explanatory variable. Note that we multiplied the Gini 
coefficients by a factor of 100 to create a Gini index to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients. The 
Gini index spans from 0 to 100 whilst the Gini coefficient spans from 0 to 1. 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics over Gini coefficient developments over time, pre transfers 
Year 
 
Obs 
(aggregated) 
Mean 
(original) 
Mean 
(additional) 
Mean 
(aggregated) 
Std. Dev. 
(aggregated) 
Min 
(aggregated) 
Max 
(aggregated) 
1975 8 39.9 - 39.9 4.42331 33.8 45.7 
1985 15 42 39.6 40.72 3.57815 34.5 47.3 
1990 11 43.5 43.25 43.4 2.61534 39.6 47.4 
1995 18 46.2125 45.18 45.63889 3.09594 40.3 50.8 
2000 18 46.5125 45.95 46.2 3.06709 41.5 51.6 
2005 20 46.9875 46.1 46.455 4.39311 36.5 55.7 
2010 22 46.3375 45.76429 45.97273 3.88222 38.2 53.4 
At a first look at the data it seems as inequality has increased since the start of the measurements in 1975, it 
has however stayed on a relatively stable level since the start of the 2000s. The means in table 5.4 are divided 
into three columns. The first column consist of data for Canada, Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States who have been included throughout the whole time period, with 
the exception of Portugal in 1985 and Finland and Greece in 1990. The second column shows the mean for the 
additional countries that have been included as more data became available and the third column displays the 
aggregated mean for all countries in a given year. During the observed time period the trend in inequality 
seem to be consistent between the various compositions of countries and tell basically the same story of 
growing inequality.  
 
The descriptive statistics over developments in aggregated Gini coefficient indicates a similar story as the one 
portrayed by the OECD. Relative to the aggregated Gini of 39.9 in 1975, the absolute change of 6.0723 points 
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increase to 45.9 in 2010, constitute a 15.2 percent increase in inequality pre transfers and tax in the OECD 
countries during the observed time period.91   
The development of the pre-tax Gini coefficients over time in 11 of the countries included in our data has been 
examined by Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) using LIS data. The time period they examine stretches 
roughly from the beginning of the 1980s up until the year 2000, with an average absolute change of 5.29 of 
the mean values, which constitute a 16.5 percent increase for all the countries included in their data, which is 
very much in line with our findings. The larger increase in the data from Kenworthy and Pontusson may well 
be due to the smaller sample of countries.  
Data on the pre-tax Gini coefficient developments is also provided by the OECD in the report “Divided we 
stand”. For the time period between the 1980s up until 2005 the average Gini coefficient for 8 of the countries 
included in our data increased by 6.87 points or 20.9 percent.92 Data over the developments in the pre-tax Gini 
coefficient starting from circa 1985 also indicates similar developments in Denmark and Finland, which both 
experienced growing inequality from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, while inequality during this time period 
declined in the Netherlands.93 
Despite of some difference in the numbers, the different data sources all indicate a similar pattern in the 
development of the Gini coefficient pre-tax, with rising inequality in all countries included in the sample for 
which we have several observations, except for the Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and France, comparing 
the first and the last observations. 
After the first examination of the descriptive statistics of our data some preliminary observations can be noted. 
Since the measure of inequality has increased, while the share of right-wing party vote share has decreased, 
there might be a negative statistical association between the two. On the other hand, a positive statistical 
association seems to exist between demand for redistribution and increased inequality. Still, as these are 
aggregated statistics, we cannot draw anything but tentative and preliminary conclusions from these 
descriptive statistics. 
6. Econometric strategy, methodological issues and results 
In this section we test the theories proposed in section 2, the median voter theorem and the social distance 
model, empirically. We do this by examining the relationship between two different dependent variables 
thought to capture demand for redistribution – indirectly as right party vote share and directly through a 
survey question – and pre-tax economic inequality. The median voter theorem predicts a positive correlation 
                                                     
91 The percent increase in inequality is calculated by dividing the change in aggregated mean between 1975 and 2010 
with the aggregated mean in the start of the time period, in 1975. ([0.459 - 0.399] / 0.399)  
92 Countries included are: Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom (GB only) and 
the United States.  
93 OECD (2011) Table 7.3 
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between demand for redistribution and economic inequality, whilst the social distance model predicts a 
negative correlation between economic inequality and demand for redistribution. Summary statistics for all 
control variables can be found in table A.3 in the appendix. We have also estimated all models using a post-
tax measure of economic inequality. However, as this measure is methodologically inferior, we only include 
them in section A.8 in the appendix.  
6.1 Right-wing party vote share 
6.1.1 Econometric strategy 
The first model concerns the relationship between right-wing party vote share and economic inequality and 
uses data on the national level. Since we have repeated measurements for all analytical units, the data used in 
estimating this relationship can be conceptualized as a small T, large N (N > T) panel. However, it is obvious 
that with N = 23 countries our N is notably smaller than panels with small T and N = 500 or more, which is 
more common in economics, which may lead to problems of statistical inference due to small sample issues, 
as much of the econometrics today relies on asymptotic theory. 
The variables of main theoretical interest are the measurements of economic inequality and also the 
unemployment rate. The unemployment rate data comes from OECD; and is harmonized to enable 
comparisons between countries and time. In order to strengthen the validity of our claims on the structural 
relationship between inequality and demand for redistribution, measured as right-wing party vote share, it is 
necessary to control for other variables that may be correlated with both party vote share and inequality. If we 
do not control for these variables, our model may well suffer from omitted variable bias, and the results of our 
econometrical estimation would not be credible. However, it is important only to include controls that we 
suspect would bias the results if not included. If one included every variable that we suspect may correlate 
with the dependent variable, we might actually bias our estimator further without being aware of it.94 The 
control variables included in the regression can broadly be defined as either relating to political institutions 
and demographics or economic variables. We control for plurality voting systems such as first-past-the-post 
voting systems used in the US and the UK, in contrast to proportional and semi-proportional systems, as we 
know that these systems produce fewer political parties compared to proportional systems, thus generating 
higher vote shares for each effective party. Since this voting system is common in the Anglophone world 
where inequality is on average higher than in the non-Anglophone world, not controlling for this would 
certainly bias our estimations.95 Voting in elections is known to be more common among well-educated and 
wealthier individuals, even though it is one of the most equal forms of political participation, and it is 
therefore reasonable to suspect that lower voter turnout is associated with less demand for redistribution and 
                                                     
94 This happens if we have two opposing directions of bias, i.e. if our explanatory variable is correlated with two 
unobservables, biasing the explanatory variable in different directions, thus basically cancelling each other out. If one of 
these variables is included but not the other our estimator would suffer from greater bias than before, even though we 
tried to correct for omitted variable bias. Of course, this argument is only valid if we do not have strong reasons to 
believe that our explanatory variable is biased, but we decide to control for other variables that we do not have reason to 
believe is biasing the estimator. 
95 Huber, Ragin & Stephens (1993), Iversen & Soskice (2009) 
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thus stronger support for right-wing parties, especially if higher economic inequality produces lower voter 
turnout and we therefore control for electoral turnout.96 Two dummy variables indicating federalist and 
presidential political systems are also included, since previous research has shown that they seem to correlate 
with right party vote share.97 We include the share of population over 65 years of age, as an increased share of 
the population living on pensions, all else equal, ought to increase the demand for redistribution, if we think of 
pensions as a form of redistribution. We also include controls for two other factors on the aggregate level that, 
however, may be problematic from an econometric point of view: globalization by the proxy variable 
logarithm of trade openness, defined as the share of imports and exports of GDP and union density defined as 
union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners in employment. Globalization is often seen to 
be associated with increasing inequality (see section 2.2.1), and may also be associated with higher perceived 
risk of the electorate of becoming unemployed et cetera which may lead to increased demand for 
redistribution.98 Thus, trade openness may be correlated both with inequality and demand for redistribution. 
Union density has been identified as a determinant of inequality and may well be positively associated with 
weaker support for right-wing parties, if the unions mobilize their members politically and the interest of the 
union lies closer to left parties than right parties.99 However, these variables might be “bad controls”, as they 
may not only correlate with inequality statistically but might actually cause it. Therefore, controlling for these 
variables might actually cause us to ”over-control”, which may lead to an increased risk of committing type II 
errors. We do include them, however, as they have been proposed as important control variables by previous 
research. 
To account for the fact that trends in right party vote share and inequality may share a positive or a negative 
time trend that is structurally unrelated, we also include time dummies (i.e. a dummy for every year except the 
first). This allows the intercept in the regression equation to vary over time, which is aimed to capture a 
general time trend in right party vote share that is structurally unrelated to changes in inequality.  Finally, 
demand for redistribution measured as right-wing party vote share, might be caused by time-constant and 
unobserved factors, αi, in each country such as political culture. Fortunately, as we are working with panel 
data, we can, using a fixed effects model, eliminate all time constant factors, observed or unobserved, that 
have an effect on the dependent variable. However, using fixed effects models compared to pooled cross-
sections are only strictly necessary if the time-constant factor αi is correlated with some or all explanatory 
variables, Xit. If the assumption Cov(αi , Xit) = 0 does not hold and Cov(Yit , αi) ≠ 0 using pooled cross-sections 
would lead to omitted variable bias. 
There are different ways to deal with the problem of unit heterogeneity: one can either estimate the model 
using first differences (FD), fixed (FE) or random effects (RE) estimation. RE estimation has the advantage 
                                                     
96 Mahler (2008) 
97 Moene & Wallerstein (2003) 
98 This is the most common proxy for globalization and trade openness in the literature. 
99 Moene & Wallerstein (2003). p. 501 
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that it allows for the estimation of the effect of time-constant variables, e.g. political institutions that do not 
exhibit any variation in the sample, which is not possible when using FE or FD estimation.100 However, for 
the RE model to be consistent it requires (in addition to the assumptions that must be fulfilled for the FE 
model to be unbiased and consistent) that E(αi , Xit) = 0, i.e. that the expected value of αi given all other 
explanatory variables is constant, which means that the time-constant factors and the other explanatory 
variables must not be correlated.101 This is a strong assumption, as time-constant factors affecting the 
conservative party vote share may well be correlated with explanatory variables affecting vote share, such as a 
corporatist political culture producing strong unions which is often found in countries with strong Social 
Democratic or Christian Democratic parties. Thus, there are reasons to believe that the αi is correlated with Xit. 
First differencing and fixed effects estimation, on the other hand, allows for arbitrary correlation between αi 
and Xit, and are therefore more suitable to use in examining the research question at hand.102 One could ask 
what the point is of using simple pooled OLS if we risk producing a biased estimator in the presence of time 
constant unobservables, but when the time constant unobservables are eliminated either through first 
differencing or fixed effects transformation (i.e. time demeaning), we also reduce the variation in our 
variables greatly, which makes the estimation of the standard errors, and thus the whole model, less efficient 
and precise. 
The difference between FE and FD is often not considered very important in the literature and largely comes 
down to if our idiosyncratic errors are serially correlated or not. However, due to technical limitations in our 
data, i.e. that we have observations at irregular time intervals which renders the differencing strategy complex 
to implement, we use the FE estimator instead of the FD estimator. A detailed discussion on the advantages 
and disadvantages of the FE and the FD is found in the appendix under A.5. 
Hence, two full models will be estimated, one using pooled OLS and one using time demeaned data: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖𝑡 +  𝜹𝒌𝑿𝒌𝒕 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    𝑡 = 1,2 … 𝑇 
?̈?𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞̈ 𝑖𝑡 +  𝜹𝒌?̈?𝒌𝒕 + ?̈?𝑖𝑡    𝑡 = 1,2 … 𝑇 
Where the accents signifies time demeaned data produced by the within transformation, 𝛽1 is the coefficient 
of principal theoretical interest, 𝜹𝒌 is a 1×N vector of parameters and 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a K×N matrix of control variables 
including time dummies and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and ?̈?𝑖𝑡 represents the idiosyncratic error terms. 
6.1.2 Methodological issues 
When we examine the relationship between right party vote share and inequality, it is apparent that the 
presumed statistical association may reflect that increased inequality does not increase or decrease right party 
                                                     
100 Wooldridge (2002) p. 251 
101 Wooldridge (2009) p. 504 
102 Wooldridge (2009) p. 504 
34 
 
vote share, but instead that increased/decreased inequality is on the contrary to the theory caused by the right 
party vote share, e.g., through tax policy changes, as discussed in section 2.2.1. In other words, we have an 
endogeneity problem in the form of reverse causality, which would lead to us violating the strict exogeneity 
assumption. This problem is not easily dealt with, especially as we have so few observations of economic 
inequality. A possible solution would be to use an instrument instead of economic inequality, i.e. a variable 
correlated with economic inequality, uncorrelated with uit and structurally uncorrelated with right party vote 
share, but this is very hard to find. Another solution would be to lag the economic inequality variable; 
however, as we have such infrequent measures of economic inequality, this is perhaps not a satisfying 
solution. However, as the measure of economic inequality that we include is pre-tax, it should be less affected 
by changes in government policy than the post-tax Gini. Still, we know that the marginal tax rate (which is 
obviously affected by which parties form government) on high incomes have a depressing effect on top 
incomes, thus, not even the pre-tax Gini can be considered completely exogenous. Still, it is certainly more 
reliable than the post-tax. 
Another endogeneity issue, which was discussed in 3.1.4, was that the political parties may adjust and tweak 
their policies to match the demand for redistribution. If these adjustments are made very close in time to the 
changes in demand for redistribution, it is possible that the voters do not perceive any substantial differences 
in the supply of redistribution, which is necessary for right party vote share to be a satisfying dependent 
variable. 
A third methodological issue is attenuation bias due to measurement error in the explanatory variables. This 
attenuation bias can be derived from the assumption that the measurement error in the explanatory variables is 
uncorrelated with the unobserved, true value of the explanatory variable, i.e., the measurement error is noise 
of some sort, and then the measurement error must be correlated with the observed value of the explanatory 
variable.103 This particular form of bias attenuates the findings, i.e. bias the coefficients towards zero, which 
may have consequences for both the statistical and economic significance. The effective size of the bias 
depends on the covariance between the measurement error and the observed value and the variance of the 
explanatory variable.104 The bias is smaller the greater the variation in the explanatory variable, however, as 
the Gini coefficient is a rather sluggish moving variable which thus limits the variation in the variable, the 
attenuation bias is a cause for concern. Also, attenuation bias particularly attenuates positive estimates and it 
is known that bias in one of the explanatory variables most often bias the whole estimator.105  
In light of the quality and quantity of the data we have at our hands when assessing the relationship between 
demand for redistribution and economic inequality, it is worth stressing that the results perhaps are not strong 
                                                     
103 Wooldridge (2009) p. 319 
104 If x*1 is the unobserved explanatory variable and e1 the measurement error, the bias is equal to 𝛽1 (
𝜎𝑥∗1
2
𝜎𝑥∗1
2 + 𝜎𝑒1
2 ) which is 
always < 𝛽1 hence the attenuation bias 
105 Wooldridge (2009) p. 320 
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enough to once and for all put the median voter theorem or the social distance model to the test, we should be 
able to draw some tentative conclusions on the relationship between demand for redistribution and pre-tax 
economic inequality. 
Finally, in the social sciences, when we do not employ experimental or quasi-experimental design, one should 
be aware that we most often cannot establish causality, but we can (hopefully) falsify hypotheses. The 
causality is in a sense “black boxed”. Hence, in this study we cannot claim that, depending on the results, 
increased demand for redistribution is caused by increased inequality as proposed by the median voter-
theorem, as we cannot observe the causal mechanism. Still, we can refute the hypothesis proposed by the 
median voter-theorem if increased inequality produces less demand for redistribution, as this goes contrary to 
the predictions of the median voter-theorem. This limitation of the design and method of the study must of 
course be kept in mind when conclusions are drawn. 
6.1.3 Empirical findings 
In table 6.1 are the results of our econometric analysis of economic inequality on right party vote share. Five 
models are estimated with increasing complexity, adding controls, year dummies and fixed effects step by 
step. 
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Table 6.1 Determinants of right party vote share  
(OLS, unst. beta coefficients, cluster-robust SE within brackets) 
  I II III IV V 
Gini pre-tax 0.338 0.365 0.331 0.0529 0.0359 
 (0.494) (0.435) (0.525) (0.477) (0.542) 
Single member  4.839 4.559 4.192* 8.430* 
  (4.644) (4.974) (2.084) (4.761) 
Federalism  -3.158 -3.728 4.293*** 6.365*** 
  (2.684) (2.498) (1.498) (2.213) 
Presidentialism  1.321 1.086 1.206 -1.056 
  (6.774) (5.449) (2.717) (4.262) 
Voter turnout  -0.369 -0.408 -0.219 -0.244 
  (0.252) (0.238) (0.184) (0.182) 
Perc. Elderly  -1.245* -1.200 0.0577 -0.194 
  (0.629) (0.836) (0.921) (0.963) 
Unemp. Rate   0.179 0.236 0.404 
   (0.785) (0.416) (0.561) 
Log open     1.694 
     (12.92) 
Union density     -0.224 
     (0.236) 
Constant 15.00 60.33 60.40* 36.67 42.40 
 (22.37) (35.29) (29.56) (26.16) (60.77) 
      
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 146 146 144 144 138 
R-squared 0.010 0.333 0.460 0.356 0.363 
Comment: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
In column I the bivariate statistical association between inequality and right party vote share is not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. If the Gini index increases by one unit right party vote share increases by 
0.338 percentage points. When controls for political institutions are included in column II, the coefficient is 
still statistically insignificant and the magnitude of the coefficient barely budges. In column III we also add 
year dummies and the rate of unemployment, which also in this case fails to reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels. Finally, in the full model, IV, we include country fixed effects, which drastically reduce 
the magnitude of the coefficient of pre-tax inequality, but only marginally reduce the size of the standard 
error.  Lastly, in column V, we also include the possible bad controls which reduces the coefficient of the Gini 
somewhat and it is still not statistically significant. 
Our findings do not support any of the theories discussed in the 3.1.1 strongly. However, even though the 
coefficients associated with our measurement of economic inequality are not statistically significant, the signs 
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are positive, indicating that a higher degree of economic inequality increases the right wing party vote share, 
which is in line with the social distance model and goes against the argument we constructed from the median 
voter theorem. This statistical insignificance might be caused by low variation in the measures of economic 
inequality. This has only previously only been tested empirically by MacRae (2006), who found a significant 
positive association, but as we noted in 3.1.2, his econometric strategy is hardly convincing. Still, we must 
keep in mind that these findings might also reflect reverse causality and may also suffer from attenuation bias. 
On the other hand, the social distance model also predicted that we would find a negative relationship between 
unemployment rate, which does not have low variation, and right party vote share, which was found but 
nowhere near conventional levels of statistical significance. However, we want to be very careful in 
interpreting between unemployment and right party vote share on the aggregate level as we do not want to 
commit an ecological fallacy: the negative coefficient may indicate that the unemployed vote for right parties 
to a lesser extent as they have higher demand for redistribution, and perhaps is unrelated to the behavior of the 
median voter.  
Nonetheless, the econometric strategy rested on the assumption that the demand for redistribution manifests 
itself indirectly in the support for right and left wing parties. If one favors higher levels of redistribution, one 
ought to vote for left wing parties and vice versa. This may of course not be true due to e.g. 
multidimensionality of elections and that matters of redistribution may not be very salient compared to other 
electoral issues. It may also be that all parties adjust themselves to changes in demand for redistribution, 
thereby offsetting any structural advantage that have arisen due to changes in demand for redistribution.  
Another issue that relates to the measure of inequality is that it may be the structure of economic inequality 
and not the level that is important for the voting decision, as it could tell us more of the social proximity 
between the median voter and the other groups, as we discuss in section 3.1.2. It could also be that it is not the 
de facto inequality that matters, but individual’s perception of inequality, as proposed by the POUM literature 
or is driven by norms of inequality, which we do not control for. Still, if these are sluggish moving, they might 
have been differentiated away with the country fixed effects. Finally, we have the problem of the assumption 
of universal turn out. For the median voter theorem to work, i.e. for the median voter to be the decisive voter, 
we must have perfect electoral turnout. However, we do not have perfect electoral turnout in any of the 
countries included in the sample, and we also know that individuals working in these countries are not always 
allowed to vote (e.g. immigrants and sentenced prisoners in certain states in the US). Thus, it is highly likely 
that the median income in the franchise is higher than the median income in the population. Also, as we do not 
have data on the structure of inequality, we do not know if the median voter has been negatively affected by 
the changes in inequality at all (this could be true if increases in inequality are concentrated among e.g. the 
poorest decile). 
Hence, several important methodological issues remain to be solved before we can consider this a satisfactory 
test of the median voter theorem and the social distance model. Therefore, the results found here should be 
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interpreted with a grain of salt, especially when coupled with the very weak findings. Our full model using 
fixed effects does however suggest that we have no strong relationship between demand for redistribution and 
economic inequality, as suggested with other measures of demand for redistribution by Bowles and Gintis 
(2000), Lübker (2007) and Kenworthy and McCall (2007) contrary to Finseraas (2008). 
6.2 Demand for redistribution 
6.2.1 Econometric strategy 
Our second dependent variable concerns demand for redistribution as measured by the survey question 
included in the European Social Survey every other year since 2002. We have chosen to estimate this 
relationship at the micro level instead of aggregating the micro data to the country level for a number of 
reasons: Firstly, aggregating micro level data ignores a lot of information on the micro level. Secondly, one of 
the theoretical interesting variables is constituted by an interaction between micro level data and macro level 
data. Thus, we would like to use as much of the variation on the micro level when assessing this interaction 
with a macro level variable. Thirdly, estimating this relationship at the micro level also enables us to identify 
what parts of the variation that is cross-sectional and which part of the variation that is due to within country 
effects and also enables us to separate the effects of the macro level variables from their micro level 
counterparts which might be theoretically important (e.g. the unemployment rate compared to an individual 
being unemployed). Lastly, and most importantly, by estimating this relationship about the behavior of 
individuals on a micro level, we do not face the risk of committing an ecological fallacy, i.e. assuming that a 
possible correlation at the aggregate level also holds for the individuals at the micro level.  
A consequence of estimating this relationship at the micro level, is that we will mix micro and macro level 
variables in the model. It is therefore important that we use clustered standard errors in estimating this 
relationship, which takes into account that our data has a hierarchical structure (i.e. that the respondents are 
nested within countries and time).106 This means that the standard errors are corrected to take into account that 
we only have one observation of inequality per year and country, and not as many independent observations 
of inequality as we have respondents in our data set. However, one should be aware that we only have 17 
countries in the ESS data, which is probably below, the minimum amounts of clusters required for the 
standard errors to be “well behaved”.107 Thus, we should once again note that the standard errors in our 
estimation may not be conservative enough, which is crucial to remember when interpreting the results. 
The data we are working with is pooled micro level cross-sections with a dependent variable with an ordinal 
scale. Assuming that the scale of the dependent variable is to be considered continuous is a far too heroic 
assumption, and we therefore recode our dependent variable to a Bernoulli variable, where “agree strongly” 
and “agree” are coded as 1 and “neither agree or disagree”, “disagree” and “disagree strongly” are coded as 0. 
When estimating the relationship between demand for redistribution and inequality our main alternatives are 
                                                     
106 Angrist & Pischke (2009) p. 231 
107 Nichols & Schaffer (2007) 
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either to estimate with a linear probability model (OLS) or using binary logistic regression. The standard 
approach would in this case be to use binary logistic or probit regression, since our dependent variable is 
discrete. However, in recent years the linear probability model has increased in popularity, perhaps due to the 
strong advocacy by economists Angrist and Pischke in their textbook “Mostly Harmless Econometrics”. The 
advantage of using the LPM compared to logistic or probit regression is the straightforwardness when 
interpreting the regression coefficients: the magnitude the effect of an explanatory variable (which should be 
interpreted as a marginal change in probability of “success” i.e. a respondent agreeing with the statement 
above) variable can be directly read from the beta coefficients in contrast to logistic or probit regression due to 
the non-linearity of these models.108 There are of course a few disadvantages. Since the probability model is 
linear, the marginal effects of the explanatory variables will be constant; the effect of a one unit increase in the 
explanatory variable changes the probability by the same amount regardless of initial value of the explanatory 
variable.109 This is not reasonable as probability is bounded between 0 and 1. Relating to this problem is the 
phenomenon of ridiculous predictions of cumulative probability i.e. that a respondent may have a negative 
predicted probability or a probability greater than 1. Also, unless all slope coefficients are equal to zero, the 
variance of the estimator is heteroscedastic, but this is easily corrected for by using robust standard errors. 
Still, despite these complications, if our main interest lays in the partial effects of our explanatory variables 
this should be reliable. According to Wooldridge “the LPM often seems to give good estimates of the partial 
effects on the response probability near the center of the distribution of x”.110 However, as a robustness check 
we will compare the estimates of our LPM with the average partial effects estimates of a binary logistic 
regression. If these do not deviate notably, we will present the estimates of the LPM. 
As before, the variables of theoretical interests are the measurements of inequality and unemployment, which 
we have already defined, but also the interaction between household income and inequality, as we would 
expect the effect of increasing inequality on demand for redistribution to be greater for individuals in the 
lower deciles, according to the median voter theorem. To account for the POUM hypothesis we add a variable 
aiming to capture social mobility. Alesina and Giuiliano (2005) employ to two different measures of social 
mobility: one concerning the occupational status of the respondent compared to his/her father, and one 
concerning the level of education. In the ESS we have no information on the occupational status of the 
respondent and his/her father, but we have information on the level of education of the father. We therefore 
construct a dummy indicating that the respondent has a higher level of education than his/her father, even 
though Alesina and Giuliano found that the effect of status of occupation is stronger. 
It is necessary to include control variables in our regression to strengthen the validity of our findings. We 
include a control for gender (coded 1 for female), as previous research have shown women to be more 
                                                     
108 Wooldridge (2002) p. 455 Thus, if the coefficients of the logistic or probit regression are not presented as odds ratios, 
we cannot tell the economic significance of the variables by simply looking at the beta coefficients, as the effect of an 
explanatory variable depends on the values of the other variables in the regression equation. 
109 Wooldridge (2002) p. 455 
110 Wooldridge (2002) p. 455 
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supportive of redistribution than men.111 Age and its square term are included, as one might suspect that one 
has a higher demand for redistribution in the parts of life when one is more dependent on the welfare state e.g. 
as a pensioner or as a university student attending publicly financed education. We include household income 
since individuals with higher incomes are known to be less favorable of redistribution as their economic gain 
is relatively smaller. Using income as an explanatory variable in a cross-country setting can indeed be 
problematic due to differences in wage levels. We address this problem by instead creating country specific 
household income deciles, which we use as a relative measure of income.112 As most of the redistribution 
takes place within the country, we believe that this is a reliable and relevant measure of relative income that 
allows for cross-country comparisons, even though it contains less information than a monetary measure of 
household income. Education, measured as years of education, is included as highly educated individuals 
probably suffers a lower risk exposure of e.g. becoming unemployed, or if they become unemployed have a 
greater probability of finding new work, due to their relatively greater human capital, and ought to have less 
need for redistribution. Previous research has also shown that higher education is related to less demand for 
redistribution.113 Number of household members is included as a larger household, assuming that not all of 
these household members are gainfully employed, ought to put a greater strain on the economy of the 
household. We control for if the respondent is a union member, as union members may be more politically 
organized and aware of their economic self-interest, and as greater redistribution logically should increase the 
reservation wage of individuals it should be in their interest to raise levels of redistribution. A dummy variable 
for gainfully employed is included and also one for if the respondent is married, as both are thought to affect 
the risk exposure of the individual. We add these individual level controls not because we think excluding 
them would bias the estimation of the effect inequality on demand for redistribution to a great extent. 
However, not controlling for these respondent characteristics would probably bias the estimation of the 
interaction effect between inequality and household income. We include both a dummy for employed and the 
national unemployment rate as the social distance model explicitly states that it is the rate of unemployment 
affects the likelihood of an individual becoming unemployed or getting a job, but being employed as such 
should also have an effect on demand for redistribution. However, by doing this we risk to over control for the 
effect of unemployment and thereby rendering both coefficients statistically insignificant due to 
multicollinearity. We include a dummy variable indicating of the respondent attends religious ceremonies at 
least on a monthly basis. Finally, on the individual level, we include a dummy variable for belonging to a 
minority in the country the respondent lives in. 
                                                     
111 Alesina & Giuliano (2009)  
112 This is the most convenient way to solve this issue, as the ESS in the second wave only distribute data on which 
national household income decile the household belongs to, and not the monetary value as such. If this was not the case, 
we could have interacted the deviation of the household income from the national mean interacted with the country 
dummies.  
113 Cusack et al (2006), Iversen & Soskice (2001) 
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Ideally, we would like to control for if the respondent has immigrated to the country, but the ESS does not 
provide any data on this. Alesina has previously shown that redistribution is affected negatively by ethnic 
fractionalization.114 In the section determinants of inequality, migration was also discussed as a possible 
driving factor behind the increasing inequality, and as it is hard to find data on migrant flows we proxy it with 
by ethnic fractionalization. Finseraas argues that one should not include left-right ideology as a control due to 
the possible endogeneity problem of demand for redistribution determining ideology and not the other way 
around and we do therefore not control for left-right ideology. We also include dummy variables for countries 
and year to allow for different intercepts between countries and waves of the ESS. We also control for three 
variables on the macro level, namely openness of the economy as a measure of openness of the economy, 
union density, percentage of the population over 65 years of age. However, both union density and openness 
of economy might be bad controls, as we discuss in 6.1.2, and might lead us to “over-control” as they might 
not only correlate with inequality but actually cause it. 
Thus, the full model estimated will be: 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑖 × 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 +  𝜹𝒌𝑿𝒌 + 𝑢𝑖 
Where 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the coefficient of principal theoretical interest, 𝜹𝒌 is a 1×N vector of parameters and 𝑿𝒌 
is a K×N matrix of control variables including time and country dummies and 𝑢𝑖 is the error term. 
6.2.2 Methodological issues 
The most apparent methodological drawback is that we do not have data on all the 23 countries in our sample. 
Fortunately, we have a variety of different types of welfare state regimes, linguistic and cultural areas in our 
ESS data, which levitates this problem somewhat and increases the external validity. Still, we are convinced 
that it is better to use reliable data with enough observations to produce reasonably reliable estimates than to 
use data with only a handful of countries such as provided by the International Social Survey Program, 
although including countries from outside of Europe, which would make it impossible to produce well-behave 
clustered standard errors, and where we have a maximum of two survey waves per country, rendering it 
extremely difficult to estimate the effect of the sluggish moving inequality variable on demand for 
redistribution. In addition to this, our model might suffer from omitted variable bias as we do not control for 
norms regarding acceptance of inequality. If, e.g., poverty is seen as self-caused, this might of course lead to 
people accepting higher levels of economic inequality and accepting lower levels of government 
redistribution. However, if these norms are sluggish, they will hopefully be captured by country dummy 
variables. 
We still face the issues of attenuation bias, structure vs level of inequality and low variation in the economic 
inequality. However, as these issues are basically the same as for right party vote share, we do not discuss this 
                                                     
114 Alesina et al (2003) 
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in further detail here. The problem of reverse causality is not as straight-forward for this dependent variable as 
for right-party vote share. The idea is that demand for redistribution is not driven by inequality, but that the 
level of inequality is instead caused by the demand for redistribution, i.e. the demand for redistribution, e.g., 
forces the politicians to enact policies that affect inequality. Still, using pre-tax inequality should be more 
exogenous than post-tax inequality. 
Finally, we have the problems of comparability through space and time, which we touched upon in 5.4. It is 
possible that individuals in different countries and years interpret the question asked by the ESS differently, 
which renders the comparison useless. It might also be that, considering that we are just studying an eight year 
period, the variation in inequality is too small to leave a substantial mark on the demand for redistribution. 
6.2.3 Empirical findings 
In table 6.2 below are the results of the linear probability model regression. Like in section 6.1.3, five models 
are estimated with increasing complexity.  First we present the bivariate relationship. We then add control 
variables on the individual level. The next column contains the rate of unemployment and, finally, the full 
model contains the interaction term. The last column also includes the potentially bad controls. All estimations 
include a full set of country and year dummies. Note that this model is a linear probability mode which means 
that we interpret the coefficients as, in this case, the increased probability to believe that government 
redistribution should increase. 
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Table 6.2 Determinants of demand for redistribution  
(LPM, beta coeff., cluster-robust SE within brackets) 
  I II III IV V 
Gini pre-tax 0.00997 0.00963 0.00401 0.000909 -0.00717 
 (0.00637) (0.00680) (0.00239) (0.00589) (0.00434) 
Houseinc*Pre    0.000604 0.000620 
    (0.000759) (0.000752) 
Age  0.00517*** 0.00514*** 0.00517*** 0.00516*** 
  (0.00131) (0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00132) 
Age^2  -0.0000434*** -0.0000430*** -0.0000433*** -0.0000432*** 
  (0.0000126) (0.0000128) (0.0000127) (0.0000127) 
Female  0.0543*** 0.0546*** 0.0547*** 0.0548*** 
  (0.00572) (0.00569) (0.00570) (0.00571) 
Edu (years)  -0.00787*** -0.00787*** -0.00792*** -0.00789*** 
  (0.00122) (0.00123) (0.00121) (0.00122) 
Househ inc  -0.0223*** -0.0223*** -0.0504 -0.0513 
  (0.00275) (0.00280) (0.0345) (0.0341) 
Househ. memb  0.00591** 0.00593** 0.00610** 0.00606** 
  (0.00273) (0.00271) (0.00261) (0.00263) 
Employed  -0.00927 -0.00890 -0.00861 -0.00755 
  (0.00584) (0.00586) (0.00598) (0.00594) 
Rel attend  -0.0220** -0.0223** -0.0225** -0.0226** 
  (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0101) 
Minority  0.0261 0.0266 0.0259 0.0263 
  (0.0177) (0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0177) 
Union memb  0.0722*** 0.0725*** 0.0727*** 0.0723*** 
  (0.00912) (0.00912) (0.00914) (0.00922) 
Soc mob (edu)  -0.00207 -0.00205 -0.00182 -0.00206 
  (0.00600) (0.00599) (0.00606) (0.00595) 
Unemp rate   -0.00308 -0.00289 0.000962 
   (0.00483) (0.00486) (0.00337) 
Ethnic fract   -0.0721*** -0.0720*** 0.176** 
   (0.0150) (0.0147) (0.0687) 
Perc. Elderly   0.0445** 0.0446** 0.0336*** 
   (0.0162) (0.0159) (0.00925) 
Union density     0.00320 
     (0.00421) 
Log open econ     0.497*** 
     (0.106) 
Constant 0.295 0.335 0.654* 0.794** -3.739** 
 (0.273) (0.275) (0.332) (0.346) (1.275) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 124599 92089 92089 92089 92089 
R-squared 0.073 0.102 0.103 0.103 0.104 
Comment: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 
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Column I contains the relationship between pre-tax Gini and demand for redistribution, including year 
and country dummies. The magnitude of the coefficient is small, although positive, and is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels: a one point increase in the pre-tax Gini index would 
lead to an increased probability of a respondent stating that increased government redistribution is 
good by approximately 1 percentage point.115 In column II we add individual level characteristics, as 
described above, which all have the expected sign on the coefficients, although some are not 
statistically significant. The coefficient and standard error of the pre-tax Gini barely nudges. We then 
add three macro level variables in column III, which reduces the magnitude of the pre-tax Gini to 
0.00401 and it is still not significant at conventional levels. The rate of unemployment is not 
statistically significant and has a negative coefficient, contrary to the prediction of the social distance 
model. Finally, the full model is found in column IV, where we also include an interaction effect; 
however, the coefficient of pre-tax Gini is drastically reduced to 0.000909, which is hardly 
economically significant, with the coefficient of the interaction effect being even smaller but also 
positive, as predicted by the median voter theorem. Even an increase with inequality by two standard 
deviations would only increase the probability of a respondent agreeing with the statement by less than 
one percentage point. Neither is statistically significant. The rate of unemployment is still not 
statistically significant and is also negative.  Finally, in the last model we include the bad controls 
mentioned previously. The coefficient of pre-tax inequality changes sign and becomes negative, in line 
with the social distance model, but fails to reach statistical significance, whilst the coefficient and 
standard error of the interaction term changes only marginally. Thus, neither the median voter theorem 
nor the social distance model is supported by our findings. However, judging from the signs of the 
coefficients, these are in line with the predictions of the median voter theorem. 
As a robustness check we also estimated models IV with an alternative specification of the dependent 
variable with its original five-step ordinal scale. The findings were in all important aspects the same as 
for the estimations in column IV. 
Consistent for models I-V is that our measure of social mobility is not statistically significant, and the 
magnitude of the coefficient, although negative as predicted by the POUM hypothesis, is also 
constantly near zero. This speaks against the POUM-hypothesis as put forward by Benabou and Ok, 
but one should also question if this measurement of social mobility may not be too crude and blunt. 
All in all, we find very little support for the two theories tested in this paper. This is in line with the 
majority of the previous studies of the determinants of demand for redistribution (Bowles & Gintis 
2000; Lübker 2007; Kenworthy & McCall 2007) who find no significant statistical association 
between inequality (measured as both pre-tax and post-tax inequality) and demand for redistribution, 
but contrary to the findings of Finseraas (2008) and MacRae (2006).  As we pointed out in section 
                                                     
115 As this is LPM we interpret the coefficients as marginal changes in probability. 
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3.1.1, however, most of the studies where methodologically unsatisfactory and it is possible that the 
findings of Finseraas and MacRae would be refuted with the usage of more reliable econometric 
strategies and particularly the inclusion of more data, in terms of a longer time frame, which would 
enable capturing the temporal dynamics, and the inclusion of more countries, respectively. Finseraas 
also uses the post-tax Gini, and thus reverse causality might be a serious issue. 
However, a number of important caveats must be kept in mind when interpreting these results, some of 
which we have already discussed in 6.13. Measurement error is still a possible source of bias, which 
may attenuate the findings, and reverse causality is still an issue. Also, it may well be that it is the 
structure of inequality that is relevant, and not the level of inequality as measured by the Gini 
coefficient. It is furthermore possible that the 8 year time-frame contains too little variation in 
inequality to enable a precise estimate of the effect, especially as the large changes in inequality 
seemed to have taken place in the late 1980s. However, in contrast to the findings in 6.1.3, this data 
should not be by the possibly problematic assumption of universal turnout, as the ESS includes e.g. 
migrant workers who are not allowed to vote. Also, multidimensionality should neither be a problem 
for this dependent variable, indicating that it is not the failure of the political mechanism of the median 
voter theorem that is the problem. The socioeconomic bias in partaking in public opinion surveys, i.e., 
that the well-educated and well-off vote to a higher degree than individuals in a lower socioeconomic 
positions, may not be as severe for survey participation as for voting. Thus, with the survey data from 
the ESS we probably come closer to the median voter theorems assumption of universal suffrage, than 
with the voting data. Finally, we must also be aware of the possible problems of comparability through 
space and time mentioned in 5.4. 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the relationship between economic inequality and demand for 
redistribution for 23 OECD countries and 17 European countries respectively. It is important to study 
redistribution, or the size of government, in itself, since approximately 45% of GDP among the OECD 
countries is collected and spent by governments, but it is also important as, e.g. large redistribution 
have been said to hinder economic growth. Most of the previous literature has focused on the effect of 
economic inequality on redistribution as such, but we instead focus on the earlier step in the causal 
chain, arguing that if economic inequality should have an effect on redistribution this must be 
mediated through changes in demand for redistribution. We depart from two different theories with 
contradictory predictions of the relationship between demand for redistribution and economic 
inequality: the median voter theorem predicting a positive correlation (Meltzer and Richard 1986), and 
the social distance model (MacRae 2006) predicting a negative correlation. We tested the theories 
using two different measures of demand for redistribution: aggregate vote share of right wing parties 
and individual attitudes towards increased government redistribution. We used election data from 
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between 1975 and 2009, and survey data from 2002-2010. This enabled us to exploit the cross-
sectional and time variation in economic inequality, in studying the effect on demand for 
redistribution. The data used to test the theories enabled us to use a panel data approach, i.e., fixed 
effects estimation, when studying the right party vote share and to control for country fixed effects in 
examining the survey data. The main contribution of this paper lies in the usage of new data, 
inequality data from 2005 and 2010 and the latest round of the ESS, together with more robust and 
reliable econometric estimation techniques. 
The results of the econometric estimation for both measures of demand for redistribution does not 
support any of the theories strongly, and are principally in line with a number of other studies (Bowles 
& Gintis 2000; Lübker 2007; Kenworthy & McCall 2007) who do not find a statistically significant 
association between economic inequality and demand for redistribution. However, as we do not find 
strong results with neither of the two data types, this might indicate that it is not (only) the political 
mechanism of the median voter theorem that is the problem, which has been framed as key 
explanation for the mixed empirical evidence. The absence of strong results also for the survey data 
indicate that the causal mechanism fails earlier in the causal chain.  
Still, when interpreting the results a few important methodological caveats must be kept in mind. It 
could be that we did not have enough variation in our measures of economic inequality, or that our 
measure of inequality (the Gini coefficient) did not tap into an interesting dimension of inequality 
when considering demand for redistribution. One should be aware that a stable Gini coefficient does 
not imply that the structure of inequality does not change: changes in towards more inequality for 
some could be offset by changes towards more equality for others, thus keeping the level of the Gini 
constant.  
Hence, the issue of the effect of economic inequality is far from settled. Perhaps the best way forward, 
in face of the methodological issues discussed in this paper, is an empirical approach more in line with 
the experimental paradigm in economics, i.e., to try and find a pseudo-natural experiment where 
inequality has drastically risen due to e.g. austerity reforms. Another way forward would be to try to 
study the effect of the structure of inequality rather than the level of inequality. Still, judging from this 
and previous studies, there does not seem to be a strong effect of inequality on demand for 
redistribution.
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Appendix 
A.1 List of countries included in the study 
Right-wing party vote share 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
 
Demand for redistribution (ESS) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
 
A.2 Determinants of post-tax inequality 
As mentioned with the quote from Stolper and Samuelson it is always possible to bribe the suffering 
factor by subsidies or other redistributive devices so as to leave all factors better off as a result of 
trade. Even if pre transfers and tax inequality, is rising, a more equal income distribution can be 
achieved through social security systems redistributing income through transfer payments, benefiting 
those with low labour market income116. In addition to transfers, tax systems who have a 
proportionately higher income tax for those with higher wages than those with lower, also help to 
decrease inequality by levelling out the household disposable income. This is supported by Gini index 
data from the OECD, stating that income inequality after taxes and transfers in the OECD countries 
was about 25 % lower than inequality in income before taxes and transfers in the late 2000s.117 
However, the OECD state in their report “Divided we stand” that tax benefit systems in the OECD-
countries have grown less efficient in reducing inequality.118 In the OECD-countries the extent of 
redistribution grew from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s. Across the 29 countries the OECD observed 
                                                     
116 Labour market income inequality is constituted of differences in wage rates, hours worked and by 
employment rates (OECD, 2012). 
117 OECD (2012) p. 5  
118 OECD (2011) p. 292 
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over this time period, average social expenditure grew from 17.0 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s to 
20.1 percent of GDP by the year 2005.119  But this increase in redistribution did not match the growth 
in market income inequality, which grew by twice as much, causing the overall level of inequality to 
incline. The average Gini coefficient for the OECD countries stood at 0.29 in the 1980s but have since 
then increased to an average of 0.316, an increase of almost 10 percent.120 Redistribution systems have 
been generally effective at decreasing the effects of widening income gaps, which have been driven by 
falling income at the bottom of the income scale. However, these systems have been less effective at 
reducing the effect of growing inequality caused by rising top incomes.121  
Traditional right wing policies, such as decreasing the overall tax burden are said by the OECD to 
have benefited those with high or very high income, and thereby increased income gaps in the OECD-
countries during the last decade.122  
A.3 Measures of Inequality 
A.3.1 The Gini coefficient 
The Gini coefficient is a measure of relative wealth and is derived from the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz 
curve is depicted in figure 4.2 below, and shows the cumulative share observations from the lowest to 
the highest of a resource and then plots the cumulative proportion of the population on the X-axis and 
the cumulative proportion of the variable of interest on the Y-axis.123 The 45 degree line in the figure 
represents a state of perfect or absolute inequality. The Gini coefficient then is equal to twice the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal.124 For an illustration of the Lorentz curve, see figure A.1 
below. 
 
The minimum value of the Gini coefficient is 0, which corresponds to a state where all resources in the 
country are distributed equally between all individuals and the Lorentz curve and the diagonal collapse 
and the maximum value is 1, corresponds to the hypothetical state where one individual receives all 
earnings in society.  
 
  
                                                     
119 OECD (2011) p. 264 
120 OECD (2011) p. 22 
121 OECD (2011) p.292 
122 OECD(2011) p.292 
123 Hale (2003) 
124 There are several different ways to calculate the Gini, however, the details will not be discussed here. 
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Figure A.1 The Lorenz Curve 
 
A.3.2 Alternative measures of inequality 
A possible alternative to the Gini coefficient would be using ratios such as the 90/10 and 80/20 ratios, 
indicating how much larger the 90th percentile’s share of the total national earnings are compared to 
the 10th percentile.125 Closely related to the ratio measures is income share data, found in, e.g., the 
world top income database, showing how large share of the total earnings in the economy that belongs 
to the 10th decile. An obvious drawback of the percentile ratio and the share measurements is that they 
are not full-information measures, i.e. do not use all the information on the income distributions 
provided by the data. The ratio measure only uses the information on the two relevant deciles or 
percentiles and the share measure only uses the information of e.g. top decile earnings as a share of 
total earnings in the population.  Thus, they do not necessarily satisfy the fundamental first principle of 
inequality measures, the weak principle of transfers, because transfers might take place outside of the 
relevant percentiles/deciles. As ranking measures, they do however satisfy the scale invariance and 
population properties. However, they do not satisfy the fourth and fifth criteria. Still, the ratios and 
shares have one key advantage compared to the Gini coefficient: even though they do not provide us 
with a summary measure of the level of inequality, they tell us something about the structure of 
inequality. Also, the ratios and shares are often more easily computed which has enabled the 
construction of longer time series (e.g. for the world top income database we have time-series for 
certain countries stretching as far back as the 1880s, and we also have more frequent measures and 
thus more detailed knowledge about the development of inequality). 
A.3.3 UTIP data description and quality 
Before LIS data was available, a widely used data set was the Deiringer and Squire data set (DS) 
assembled for and provided by the World Bank.126 However, in an article published in the Journal of 
Economic Literature, Atkinson and Brandolini convincingly put forward the caveats and problems of 
using second order data sets (assembled data sets of ready-made data, i.e. inequality measurements 
that the researcher does not have to calculate themselves ) such as this.127 As a consequence of the 
                                                     
125 Jenkins & Van Kerm (2009) p.50 
126 Atkinson & Brandoloni (2001) p. 782 
127 Atkinson & Brandolini (2001)  p. 782 
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ready-made character of this data set different kinds of data, variable definitions and sampling 
techniques are used for constructing Gini coefficients, rendering the comparability over time and 
between countries dubious, so that “differences in methodology may affect not just the level but also 
the trend in inequality”.128 An illustration of this problem is that, according to the DS dataset, both 
Spain and the United Kingdom are said to be more equal than Norway, Denmark and Sweden, which 
is quite contrary to common belief and the LIS data.129 The correlation between the LIS key figures 
and the DS data is also a mere 0.48, according to Atkinson and Brandolini.130 The problems associated 
with DS data are highly important for this study, as this data set is used to construct the University of 
Texas Inequality Project’s (UTIP) measure of household inequality.131 The UTIP measure of 
household inequality is estimated through regressing the UTIP-UNIDO measures of manufacturing 
inequality – the dispersion of earnings across industrial categories in the manufacturing sector - on the 
DS data.132 Even though we have no reason for questioning the quality of the UTIP-UNIDO 
measurement of earnings inequality in manufacturing industries, the combination of this data with the 
DS data to econometrically estimate household inequality seems to be a project of high uncertainty 
and a careful examination of the data against a benchmark is indeed necessary. However, if the 
relationship between the LIS data and the UTIP measurement of household inequality was strong, we 
could use UTIP’s long time-series with annual observations within the time period of 1963-2003 for 
most countries in our sample. Below we assess the quality of the UTIP data using the LIS data as our 
benchmark, first by performing a pooled regression and then by examining pure correlations. 
The UTIP measure of household inequality generally estimates inequality to be higher compared to the 
LIS Gini. The regression line notably falls below the 45 degrees line, and the observations are fairly 
loosely scattered around the regression line. The R-squared of the regression is .3947 and the beta 
coefficient is equal to .72. This implies that the UTIP household inequality measure can account for 
approximately 39% of the variation in the LIS Gini and that for every one unit increase in UTIP 
inequality we would expect the LIS to increase by .72. 
Table A.3.4 Correlation matrix between three different measurements of inequality 
    UTIP 
2000 LIS .5278 
 n 12 
1995 LIS .8217 
 n 12 
All years LIS 0.6282 
                                                     
128 Atkinson & Brandolini (2001)  p. 780 
129 Atikonson & Brandolini (2001) p. 776 
130 See Gottschalk & Smeeding (1997) p. 687 The countries included in in this comparison are Spain, Finland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway, Ireland, France, Australia and the United States between the years 1970 and 1993. 
131 Galbraith & Kumh (2004) 
132 Galbraith & Kumh (2004) p. 9 
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  n 99 
Comment: The sample was restricted in the following manner: the inequality measurements had to overlap for individual years (i.e. we did 
not use time windows). The following countries were included: AUS, AUT, BEL, CAN, DEN, FIN, FRA, DEU, GRC, IRE, ITA, LUX, 
NET, NOR, SPA, SWE, CHE, UK and US.  
 
A.4 Construction of data sets 
The data set was constructed in the following manner. We used the Comparative Political Data Set I 
(CPDS) provided by the University of Bern which includes election data for the 23 OECD countries 
included in our sample.  The data set also includes other politically and economically relevant data on 
electoral systems, number of parties in election etc. The electoral data we make use of include the vote 
shares of all electorally relevant parties in an election, categorized by party families, using expert 
surveys, such as liberal, social democratic, religious and conservative parties. The election data in the 
CPDS is imputed for every year with the most recent observation, thus it contains no missing values 
except for years when some countries were not democracies (e.g. some time periods for Greece, Spain 
and Portugal). Therefore, a dummy was created to indicate the year when the election took place to 
make sure that an election was not counted as several observations in the regression analysis. 
The data set, however, does not include any data on economic inequality and we therefore had to 
merge the data with the post- and pre-tax Gini coefficients provided by the OECD. Unfortunately, the 
OECD only provide measures approximately every five years on economic inequality, and we 
therefore needed to impute values of economic inequality as they only rarely match the year of an 
election. If we were not to do this, we would have very few observations which would give us less 
statistical power. There are several different ways to impute the data e.g. by interpolating moving 
averages, by filling all previous missing values with the most recent value etc. However, as economic 
inequality is rather sluggish in its evolution, and as the inequality data provided by the OECD is not 
for a certain year such as 2005 but instead described as “around mid-00’s”, we chose to impute the 
inequality data ± 2 years of the actual observation year. Thus, if we have an observation for 2005 but 
have missing values for the years 2003, 2004, 2006 and 2007 we replace the missing values with the 
2005 values. This is of course not without drawbacks, as even though inequality in 2004 probably is 
reasonably proxied by the inequality for the same country in 2005, it inevitably introduces more noise 
in the data, which may cause attenuation bias. It is thus important to note that every election is only 
counted as one observation, but that two elections, theoretically, may share the same value for the Gini 
coefficients. 
For the survey data on demand for redistribution from the ESS, we departed from the cumulative ESS 
file containing all respondents, variables and waves included in the ESS. We then merged our macro 
level variables and used the same strategy when interpolating, e.g., the inequality data as described 
above. 
56 
 
For all other variables used in this study we have annual observations with a few seemingly random 
missing values, except for the ethnic fractionalization index. For this index, calculated by Alesina et al 
(2003), we only have a few observations per country from around the year 2000 or earlier. We have 
therefore chosen not to include it in the econometrical testing for the right-party vote share data which 
stretches all the way back to 1975, but include for the testing on the ESS data. We interpolate the years 
with missing values with the most recent value. Even though this is hardly satisfactorily, it may be an 
important variable to control for. Thus the significance of this variable in the econometrical model 
should be taken with a grain of salt, especially when combined with country fixed effects. 
For the sources of the other variables, please see table A.3with descriptive statistics for control 
variables. 
A.5 Fixed effects vs first differencing 
Since both FD and FE are unbiased under the assumptions of  linear in parameters, random sampling, 
some variation in all of the explanatory variables and that the expected value of the idiosyncratic error 
conditioned on all the explanatory variables in all time periods and unobserved effect equals zero, we 
cannot use unbiasedness as a criterion for choosing between these estimators.133 They key assumption 
is the strict exogeneity assumption, which states that “the expected value of the idiosyncratic error 
given the explanatory variables in all time periods and the unobserved effect is zero: E(uit|Xi, ai) = 0”, 
i.e. there can be no feedback of the error term on the explanatory variables.134 If this assumption does 
not hold, it does not matter whether we estimate our model with and FD or FE estimator as it will be 
biased no matter what.   
A technical advantage of the FE estimator is that it is more easily implemented when we have an 
unbalanced panel, as we have in this case.135In fact, as we have irregular observations of right party 
vote share due to the fact that the countries in our sample have elections at irregular intervals both 
within and between countries FD estimation is very difficult to implement, as it requires us to define 
an interval at which to difference the data (1 year, 2 years etc.). The within transformation is far more 
easily implemented, as the time demeaning of the individual observations do not require us to define a 
time interval for differencing.  
FE is more efficient (produces smaller standard errors) than FD if Cov(ui1, uis) = 0 t ≠ s,  i.e. if the 
idiosyncratic error term is serially uncorrelated.136 It is, however, hard to make this decision on the 
                                                     
133 Wooldridge (2009) p. 487 These assumptions are assumption FE.1-4 on page 503 
134 Wooldridge (2009) p. 503 This also rules out including a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
variable. 
135 This is due to the way ai is eliminated through differencing compared to the time demeaning procedure of the 
fixed effects transformation. 
136 Wooldridge (2009) p. 487 
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grounds of efficiency as we can estimate only the time demeaned errors (üit) and not uit.137 Because of 
the technical problems of the irregularity of the observations and the unbalanced panel, it is also in this 
case complicated to estimate Δuit, needed to perform Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel 
data.138 First differencing might also be more appropriate if we have unit root in our data as it turns a 
stationary process into a weakly dependent process.139  
Still, the technical problems of implementing FD force us to choose FE as our econometric strategy. In 
general, the FE estimator seems to be more “sensitive to nonnormality, heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the idiosyncratic errors”.140 All these problems have in common that they affect the 
inference of the econometric modeling and not the estimated coefficients as such. Thus, we must be 
aware that even though we try to correct for these problems of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
using clustered standard errors, our estimate of the standard errors might not be conservative enough 
due to the limited number of our clusters and we might face a higher risk of committing type I errors. 
Fortunately, the biasedness of the FE estimator tends to zero at the rate 1/T, which is not the case for 
the FD estimator. 
A.6 Descriptive statistics 
A.6.1 List of observations of pre-tax inequality per country and year 
1975 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
   Australia Australia Australia Australia 
     Austria Austria 
 Belgium  Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium 
Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada 
 Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark Denmark 
Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland Finland 
   France France France France 
 Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany 
Greece Greece  Greece Greece Greece Greece 
     Iceland Iceland 
 Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy 
 Japan  Japan Japan Japan Japan 
 Luxembourg  Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg 
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands 
 New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand 
 Norway  Norway Norway Norway Norway 
Portugal  Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal 
      Spain 
Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden Sweden 
      Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
Kingdom 
United States United States United States United States United States United States United States 
 
A.6.2 Post-tax inequality 
Table A.6.2 Descriptive statistics over developments in aggregated post-tax Gini over time 
                                                     
137 Wooldridge (2002) p. 284 
138 Drukker (2003) 
139 Wooldridge (2009) p. 487 Unfortunately the tests for unit root also relies on being able to estimate the 
differenced equation 
140 Wooldridge (2009) p. 487 
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Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1975 8 .295625 .0656461 .212 .413 
1985 19 .2784737 .0487093 .198 .371 
1990 12 .29525 .0462388 .209 .354 
1995 21 .294 .049107 .211 .361 
2000 22 .3005 .0420948 .226 .357 
2005 23 .2986957 .0420934 .232 .385 
2010 23 .3024348 .0356254 .248 .378 
Inequality post transfers seem to have remained on a stable level during the 2000s, despite claims of 
less redistributive policies and of reduced overall tax burdens.141 This also hold true with the addition 
of the most recent years after the economic crisis of 2008.  
  
                                                     
141 OECD (2011) p.270 
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A.6.3 Control variables 
Table A.6.3 Descriptive statistics for control variables           
 Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Single Member 
Until 2000: Huber et al. (2004). 1133 .4757282 .7615904 0 2 
Federalism 
Huber et al. (2004) 1133 .5419241 .8371132 0 2 
Presidentialism 
Huber et al. (2004) 1133 .1703442 .3761009 0 1 
Voter Turnout European Journal of Political 
Research (Political Data Yearbook, 
various issues); 
 1134 78.5223 13.16538 35 95.8 
Elderly OECD (2010), "Labour Force 
Statistics: Summary tables", OECD 
Employment and Labour Market 
Statistics (database) 
 1168 12.9601 2.872648 5.726886 22.74724 
Unemployment rate OECD (2010), "Key short-term 
indicators", Main Economic Indica-tors 
(database) 
 845 6.188033 3.544297 0 20.06667 
Social expenditure OECD (2012), "Social Expenditure: 
Aggregated data", OECD So-cial 
Expenditure Statistics (database) 
 689 21.55341 5.238764 10.1 36.2 
Open economy Heston, Alan, Robert Summers and 
Bettina Aten (2012), Penn World 
Table Version 7.1 
 1163 66.5672 42.76719 9.269115 319.5532 
Union density 
Visser (2011) 1065 41.27976 19.39849 7.575857 96.35514 
Age 
ESS 150645 47.65677 18.43769 13 97 
Age2 
ESS 150645 2611.114 1848.564 169 9409 
Female 
ESS 150606 .5293215 .4991412 0 1 
Education (years) 
ESS 149550 12.06325 4.319311 0 56 
Househ Inc 
ESS 114252 5.030949 2.833313 1 10 
Open economy (log) OECD (2010), "Key short-term 
indicators", Main Economic Indica-tors 
(database) 1163 4.031366 .578004 2.226688 5.766924 
Househ Members 
ESS 151164 2.659489 1.374339 1 22 
Employed 
ESS 150645 .088984 .2847216 0 1 
Relig Attendence 
ESS 150770 5.460198 1.524712 1 7 
Minority 
ESS 149689 1.96164 .1920633 1 2 
Union Member 
ESS 150525 2.362823 .8331587 1 3 
Social Mobility 
ESS 146376 .1952779 .3964158 0 1 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization Alesina et al (2003) 23 .2258099 .2083365 .011928 .71242 
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A.7 Empirical findings for post-tax inequality 
A.7.1 Right party vote share 
Table 7.1 Determinants of right party vote share  
(OLS, unst. beta coefficients, cluster-robust SE within brackets) 
  I II III IV V 
Gini post-tax 1.753*** 1.506*** 1.687*** 0.155 0.512 
 (0.279) (0.343) (0.456) (0.535) (0.482) 
Single member 3.757 2.687 4.406* -0.121 
  (3.214) (3.576) (2.351) (5.692) 
Federalism  -3.227* -3.481** 2.446 2.393 
  (1.731) (1.644) (1.797) (2.649) 
Presidentialism 6.399 5.917 -0.181 1.528 
  (5.264) (5.340) (3.605) (4.273) 
Voter turnout  -0.0673 -0.0771 -0.0918 -0.120 
  (0.208) (0.200) (0.210) (0.220) 
Perc. Elderly  -0.651 -0.500 0.529 0.605 
  (0.452) (0.518) (1.214) (1.239) 
Unemp. Rate   -0.285 -0.330 -0.481 
   (0.508) (0.321) (0.402) 
Log open     -0.554 
     (11.79) 
Union density     0.267 
     (0.262) 
Constant -21.90** 0.193 -3.357 21.91 6.727 
 (8.023) (26.38) (27.00) (31.57) (56.60) 
      
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes 
N 167 167 163 163 157 
R-squared 0.380 0.486 0.571 0.292 0.295 
Comment: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01     
 
A.7.2 Demand for redistribution 
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Table 7.2 Determinants of demand for redistribution (LPM, beta coeff., cluster-robust SE within brackets) 
  I II III IV V 
Gini post-tax 0.00351 0.00778 -0.00105 -0.00578 -0.0112**  
 (0.00576) (0.00468) (0.00311) (0.00508) (0.00476)    
Houseinc*Post   0.000975 0.00101    
    (0.000741) (0.000748)    
Age  0.00474*** 0.00472*** 0.00479*** 0.00478*** 
  (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00124)    
Age^2  -0.0000401*** -0.0000398*** -0.0000402*** -0.0000402*** 
  (0.0000115) (0.0000116) (0.0000117) (0.0000116)    
Female  0.0542*** 0.0546*** 0.0546*** 0.0547*** 
  (0.00569) (0.00569) (0.00570) (0.00569)    
Edu (years)  -0.00765*** -0.00768*** -0.00781*** -0.00781*** 
  (0.00112) (0.00114) (0.00107) (0.00107)    
Househ inc  -0.0221*** -0.0220*** -0.0502** -0.0511**  
  (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.0201) (0.0203)    
Househ. memb 0.00642** 0.00638** 0.00691*** 0.00695*** 
  (0.00258) (0.00252) (0.00235) (0.00234)    
Employed  -0.00768 -0.00848 -0.00764 -0.00637    
  (0.00542) (0.00560) (0.00568) (0.00549)    
Rel attend  -0.0164* -0.0166* -0.0164* -0.0162*   
  (0.00892) (0.00898) (0.00886) (0.00890)    
Minority  0.0181 0.0185 0.0180 0.0181    
  (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0164)    
Union memb 0.0706*** 0.0707*** 0.0714*** 0.0713*** 
  (0.00901) (0.00899) (0.00893) (0.00893)    
Soc mob (edu) -0.00237 -0.00230 -0.00223 -0.00220    
  (0.00566) (0.00566) (0.00573) (0.00562)    
Unemp rate   -0.00113 -0.00118 -0.00187    
   (0.00268) (0.00267) (0.00322)    
Ethnic fract  -0.0370** -0.0379** 0.109*   
   (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0518)    
Perc. Elderly  0.0465*** 0.0462*** 0.0279**  
   (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.00989)    
Union density    -0.00425    
     (0.00319)    
Log open econ    0.339*** 
     (0.102)    
Constant 0.603*** 0.518*** 0.420 0.569* -1.963*   
 (0.153) (0.113) (0.311) (0.296) (1.001)    
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 147695 107009 107009 107009 107009 
R-squared 0.065 0.095 0.096 0.096 0.097 
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